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MANAGING OUR MICROBIAL MARK:
WHAT WE CAN LEARN ABOUT PAY
FOR PERFORMANCE FROM EBOLA’S
ARRIVAL AT OUR SHORES
Ann Marie Marciarille†

The narrative of Ebola’s arrival in the United States has been overwhelmed by
our fear of a West African-style epidemic. The real story of Ebola’s arrival is about
our healthcare system’s failure to identify, treat, and contain healthcare associated
infections. Having long been willfully ignorant of the path of fatal infectious diseases
through our healthcare facilities, this paper considers why our reimbursement and
quality reporting systems made it easy for this to be so. West Africa’s challenges in
controlling Ebola resonate with our own struggles to standardize, centralize, and
enforce infection control procedures in American healthcare facilities.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The ebbing of the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa is very good news. The
incidence of new reported cases is greatly reduced,1 and, unlike under-reported
incidence numbers that have been seen in other epidemics, public health officials
appear to have confidence in these reported numbers. 2 It is still difficult to say exactly
which combination of domestic, international, and community efforts did the most to
reduce the number of new cases. In some places, habits and customs changed faster
than in others.3 The speed at which countries were able to improve both health and
sanitation, as well as education regarding both those issues, corresponded to a faster
reduction in Ebola cases. 4 Those countries able to faster track both incidence and
transmission from the healthcare context to the community context were able to
rapidly target transmission on all fronts.5
This Article focuses on what is, in the big picture, a side issue: what the developed
world can learn from the control of Ebola. What is true, at least in part, about control
of Ebola may also apply to the epidemics the developed world faces, specifically the
ongoing epidemic of healthcare-associated infections. Thus, the lessons of Ebola
should be writ large on the American healthcare landscape, for example:
x that hand washing matters in disease incidence and transfer;
x that communal pressure to improve things like hand hygiene can
actually make a difference, even among the less aware and less
motivated;
x that Ebola needed to be brought out of the shadows before incidence
and transfer could be fully addressed; and
x that reporting and reducing infectious disease incidence and
transmission are intimately intertwined even while false reporting or
systematic underreporting may be the norm.
1
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., EBOLA SITUATION REPORT – 21 OCTOBER 2015 (2016),
http://apps.who.int/ebola/current-situation/ebola-situation-report-21-october-2015 [http://perma.cc/NHH6YU4P] [hereinafter EBOLA SITUATION REPORT].
2
Cf. Tolu Ogunlesi, The Truth About Ebola: Battle Starts with Accurate Information, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 7, 2014, 7:55 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/truth-about-ebola-accurateinformation [http://perma.cc/HP87-CWEA] (discussing confusion regarding the incidence of Ebola in 2014).
3
See Laura Kurtzman, Understanding Ebola, UCSF NEWS CENTER (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://www.ucsf.edu/news/2014/10/120016/understanding-ebola [http://perma.cc/Y3RW-UFUD].
4
Id. (observing that at Emory University Hospital, for example, proper use of personal protective
equipment prevented secondary Ebola infections).
5
See EBOLA SITUATION REPORT, supra note 1.
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This Article examines what the United States’ minor brush with Ebola as
compared to West Africa’s much more major crisis indicates about the American
healthcare system, and the United States’ capacity to learn lessons from the developing
world. Ebola’s presence, however limited, in American acute care facilities has
illuminated limitations in current infection-control procedures in American hospitals
and healthcare facilities.6 Yet little has been done to extend lessons learned from Ebola
transmission to non-Ebola infectious disease control.7
In this way, America has more in common with West Africa than many may
think.
The World Health Organization (“WHO”) has argued that focusing on a single
disease often disrupts health systems in the developing world. 8 Similarly, this Article
argues that while focusing on one disease allows provision of specialty care for that
particular disease alone, that singular focus also fails to place that disease’s spread in
the larger context of infection control failures in America’s healthcare facilities.
The public is somewhat persuaded that the proliferation of hand sanitizer
dispensers in places public and private will immunize them.9 Thus, we alternately
confront our own worst fears of a “super bug,” and by doing so, push concerns about
system weaknesses to the periphery, allowing us to manage to continue to participate
in our communal lives. Part of a communal life includes the experiences of acute care
hospitalization and nursing home residence, but these facilities are organized much as
they have been for decades.10
And, yet, everything in our perception of infection control practices has changed
with the arrival of Ebola. The organization of infectious disease control in American
healthcare institutions needs to be standardized, centralized, and enforced if America is
going to battle its own epidemics successfully.
When the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) announced that
any acute care facility capable of implementing strict infection control procedures
should be capable of caring for an Ebola case, 11 this announcement should have given
many in infection-control circles pause. There are, and have been, significant

6
See Public Health Experts Urge U.S. Hospitals To Be Prepared as Ebola Outbreak Accelerates, 10
EMERGENCY DEP’T MGMT. 109 (2014) [hereinafter Hospital Preparation] (examining whether standard
infection control practices are strong enough to manage the Ebola outbreak).
7
Ebola’s arrival in the United States offers an interesting lens through which to view healthcare
associated infections but other pandemics also would offer further perspective.
8
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Essential Health Services Situation Reports: Background (2016),
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/health-systems-recovery/ehs-background/en/ [http://perma.cc/ELU8ZPGC] (explaining that the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa “had a devastating effect” on the health
systems in West African countries due in part to the disruption of “vital ongoing programmes”).
9
See Laura Barton, Hand Sanitisers: Saved by the Gel?, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2012, 3:01 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2012/may/13/do-we-really-need-hand-sanitisers
[http://perma.cc/2XBT-SMKV] (outlining popular beliefs giving rise to the surge in hand sanitizer use).
10
Alana Semuels, Building Better Nursing Homes, ATLANTIC (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/a-better-nursing-home-exists/390936/
[http://perma.cc/B5JW-NJQZ] (“Nursing homes have been run the same way for decades . . . .”); see also
Beth Kutscher, Outpatient Care Takes the Inside Track, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Aug. 4, 2012),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20120804/MAGAZINE/308049929 [http://perma.cc/S9C9-66KE] (discussing various changes needed in the
the acute-care realm).
11
See CDC, When Caring for Patients Under Investigation (PUIs) or Patients with Confirmed Ebola
Virus Disease (EVD), CDC.GOV (Dec. 29, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/evaluatingpatients/think-ebola.html [http://perma.cc/NV5Q-BCCZ] (outlining procedures to help healthcare workers
recognize and care for Ebola patients); see also Hospital Preparation, supra note 6 (suggesting ways for
hospitals to prepare for and treat Ebola).
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challenges to infection-control success at United States acute-care hospitals.12 The
protocols to strictly control infections have failed.13 Whatever caused these failings,
the assertion that the issues were simple and known should have given any listener
pause. Strict infection control in United States acute care facilities has not been our
strong suit.14
Perhaps the group least informed about biology and public health are those who
think the Ebola virus is naturally spread by airborne transmission. 15 Fear that we may
be unable to control the spread of an infection like Ebola might be found on either end
of the spectrum.16 Those best informed about healthcare infectious disease control in
American hospitals are cognizant of the astonishingly poor record for implementing
infection-control protocols.17 These two groups may share a common fear: that
domestic infectious disease control practices are not up to the task, even though they
may not share a common understanding of the assignment. The Ebola virus certainly
makes for some interesting bedfellows.
The CDC’s assertion that hospitals could manage Ebola infection highlights our
need to acknowledge and manage our microbial mark if our goal is to attain a “normal,
healthy microbiome”18 in healthcare settings. The federal government is gearing up to
use pay-for-performance as its lever to motivate an attack on healthcare-associated
infections.19 Yet, in the end, we will need to blur the line between the individual,
clinical encounter for which performance is evaluated and pay issued, and public
health’s population-based approach to infectious disease control in order to succeed.
II. EBOLA AND MRSA
A. OUR FEAR OF EBOLA
West Africa’s 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic provoked fear here in the United
States.20 Americans were, and still are, palpably afraid of what such epidemics may

12
See
CDC,
Healthcare-Associated
Infections,
CDC.GOV
(Mar.
2,
2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/hai/surveillance/index.html [http://perma.cc/R7WP-5H8S] (providing information about
the incidence of various healthcare-associated infections).
13
See id.
14
I made this observation in a talk on healthcare quality at the University of Toledo School of Law’s
joint medical-legal conference (“Scalpel to Gavel”) in 2014. It provoked audible, if uneasy, laughter from a
healthcare provider-heavy crowd.
15
See CDC, Why Ebola is Not Likely to Become Airborne, CDC.GOV (Jan. 12, 2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/pdf/infections-spread-by-air-or-droplets.pdf [http://perma.cc/K8XE-NWDZ].
16
See, e.g., Valerie Richardson, CDC Chief Tries to Ease Fears of Ebola in the U.S.: ‘We Can Stop it
from Spreading’, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/3/ebolaoutbreak-highly-unlikely-us-cdc/?page=all [http://perma.cc/E23Q-DM29].
17
See Hospital Preparation, supra note 6, at 109.
18
Elizabeth A. Harris, Among New York Subway’s Millions of Riders, a Study Finds Many Mystery
TIMES
(Feb.
5,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/06/
Microbes,
N.Y.
nyregion/among-the-new-york-city-subways-millions-of-riders-a-study-finds-many-mystery-microbes.html.
19
Linking Quality to Payment, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/linkingquality-to-payment.html [http://perma.cc/SY7K-9ZHH] (“The Affordable Care Act authorizes Medicare to
reduce payments to acute care hospitals with excess readmissions” resulting from factors such as
“[c]omplications from treatments gotten during a hospital stay . . . .”).
20
See, e.g., Ebola in the U.S.: What You Need to Know Now, CBS NEWS (Oct. 1, 2014 3:20 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ebola-virus-in-us-what-you-need-to-know-now/
[http://perma.cc/GCZ7MECN].
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mean for the United States in a world with open borders. 21 Yet Americans are not
afraid of what the first arrival of Ebola22 might mean for our nation’s hospitals,23
where some thirty-five million people are admitted to roughly 5000 different hospitals
each year.24 Ebola has already arrived.25 Americans are more afraid of what it might
mean were Ebola to arrive in wholesale numbers. 26
Ebola, a zoonotic anomaly,27 can be a visually arresting killer, as it is a
hemorrhagic fever.28 The voluminous diarrhea and vomiting of Ebola victims arrests
the human gaze, and provokes fear.29
Some of this fear is based on widespread misinformation about Ebola’s
transmission rate and method of transmission.30 Almost all of this fear is steeped in
ignorance about how viruses and infections mutate, 31 and some of this fear is driven by
actual information about infection and bacterial transmission in hospitals in the United
States.32
21

See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Using a Tactic Unseen in a Century, Countries Cordon Off EbolaRacked Areas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/science/using-a-tacticunseen-in-a-century-countries-cordon-off-ebola-racked-areas.html?_r=0.
22
CDC, CDC and Texas Health Department Confirm First Ebola Case Diagnosed in the U.S.,
CDC.GOV (Sep. 30, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/s930-ebola-confirmed-case.html
[http://perma.cc/3CUY-J5LV].
23
Elizabeth Renzetti, Remember the U.S. Ebola Crisis? The Only Epidemic was Fear-Mongering, GLOBE AND
MAIL
(Feb.
27,
2015,
7:39
PM),
http://www.theglobeandmail.
com/globe-debate/remember-north-americas-ebola-crisis-the-only-epidemic-was-fearmongering/article23236339/ [http://perma.cc/JQ2L-J8KV]; see also Sabriya Rice, First U.S. MERS Patient
May be Released Soon, Health Officials Say, MODERN HEALTHCARE (May 5, 2014),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140505/NEWS/305059931 [http://perma.cc/555S-M56S].
24
CDC, Hospital Utilization (in non-Federal short-stay hospitals), CDC.GOV (Feb. 22, 2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/hospital.htm [http://perma.cc/7BMV-7CAZ].
25
Mike Bray & Daniel S. Chertow, Epidemiology and Pathogenesis of Ebola Virus Disease (Jan. 21,
2016), http://www.uptodate.com/contents/epidemiology-and-pathogenesis-of-ebola-virus-disease
[http://perma.cc/U5NQ-PJF9] (noting that Ebola is suspected to have first arrived in the U.S. as long ago as
the 1980’s in a population of imported monkeys); see generally, Michiko Kakutani, A Visit to the Biohazard
Battleground, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/09/30/books/books-of-the-timesa-visit-to-the-biohazard-battleground.html (reviewing Richard Preston’s 1994 novel The Hot Zone, including
one section about a suspected Ebola outbreak from a group of lab monkeys that was reported to have taken
an all-out effort by the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases to halt).
26
The fact that Ebola has arrived in wholesale numbers in West Africa was, at a distance, concerning
but not as fully compelling as Ebola’s arrival on our shores. Compare Madlen Davies, Ebola in Sierra Leone
is ‘Spreading Nine Times Faster than Two Months ago’, Campaigners Warn, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 3, 2014,
6:49 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-2819090/Ebola-Sierra-Leone-spreading-nine-timesfaster-two-months-ago-campaigners-warn.html [http://perma.cc/F6YZ-DZF6] (describing the widespread
incidence of Ebola in Sierra Leone) with Tara C. Smith, America’s Ebola Panic, SLATE (Oct. 6, 2015 8:00
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2015/10/ebola_panic_
anniversary_predictions_of_a_u_s_epidemic_didn_t_come_true.html
[http://perma.cc/E3ST-BNVX]
(describing “Fearbola in the United States—the out-of-proportion panic at the possibility of Ebola cases in
this country”).
27
Natalie Angier, Ebola and the Vast Viral Universe, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/science/ebola-and-the-vast-viral-universe.html.
28
CDC,
About
Ebola
Virus
Disease,
CDC.GOV
(Feb.
18,
2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/about.html [http://perma.cc/VR3V-FKUE].
29
Judy Stone, Why Ebola is a Wake Up for Infection Control, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Oct. 23, 2014),
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/molecules-to-medicine/why-ebola-is-a-wake-up-for-infection-control/
[http://perma.cc/D5GM-7PJV].
30
See Tom Fontaine, et al., CDC's Misinformation Spreads Faster than Ebola Virus, TRIBLIVE (Oct.
25, 2014,10:20 PM), http://triblive.com/news/editorspicks/6997782-74/ebola-cdc-health#axzz3nA7rnECm
[http://perma.cc/4VHM-WLV4].
31
See Erika Check Hayden, The Ebola Questions, 514 NATURE 554, 556 (2014).
32
See Healthcare-Associated Infections, supra note 12. This also includes fear of loosely reported
outbreaks of mucrormycosis (a flesh-eating fungal infection) as described in Ian Urbina & Sheri Fink, A
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Current best estimates are that one in twenty-five patients experiences a hospitalacquired infection.33 Those in the middle of the infectious disease knowledge
continuum know enough not to fear airborne transmission, but do not know enough to
fear hospital transmission. Both the most ignorant and the most knowledgeable among
us are most fearful of what the large-scale arrival of Ebola in American healthcare
settings34 might lead to.35
Remarkably, the general public appears to have become experts on infectious
disease through media coverage. Many have acquired a basic understanding or
misunderstanding of how infectious diseases are spread: isolating and treating patients,
and tracing and monitoring their contacts.36 Many are so afraid that they stigmatize
healthcare workers who treat Ebola patients, or those who are employed at healthcare
facilities that treat Ebola patients.37 A national debate has begun—a genuine teachable
moment—about whether epidemics are best controlled at the source or by internal
quarantine.38 Inevitably, this leads to comparisons of Ebola characteristics with those
of other infectious diseases.39 But, even there, people tend to focus on diseases where
epidemic-control protocols have had some success, like tuberculosis, malaria, and
HIV. 40
There is an irony to our obsession with diseases and conditions that have high
visibility, despite having relatively low incidence. We focus on conditions less likely
to kill Americans in large numbers than on healthcare-associated infections.41 For
every front page article in the Kansas City Star that tracked America’s feared Ebola
Deadly Fungus and Questions at a Hospital, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 28, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/29/us/a-deadly-fungus-and-questions-at-a-hospital.html.
33
See Healthcare-Associated Infections, supra note 12.
34
Denise Grady, Ebola Is Diagnosed in Texas, First Case Found in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/health/airline-passenger-with-ebola-is-under-treatment-indallas.html.
35
Compare Faith Karimi, From Guinea to the U.S.: Timeline of First Ebola patient in New York City,
CNN
(Oct.
25,
2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/24/health/new-york-ebola-timeline/
[http://perma.cc/4XAM-MTF7] (describing how the infection of two nurses who cared for Thomas Duncan
in Dallas “rais[ed] concerns about the nation’s ability in Dallas to deal with an outbreak”) with Steven Ross
Johnson, Do the CDC’s Ebola Precautions for U.S. Hospitals Go Far Enough?, MODERN HEALTHCARE
(Aug.
21,
2014),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140821/NEWS/308219947
[http://perma.cc/8VZB-28DX] (“‘What’s needed to fight Ebola is not fancy equipment,’ [CDC Director Dr.
Tom Frieden] said in a message posted during a Twitter chat. ‘What’s needed is standard infection control,
rigorously applied.’”).
36
Hayden, supra note 31, at 557.
37
Anemona Hartocollis & Nate Schweber, Bellevue Employees Face Ebola at Work, and Stigma of It
Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/30/nyregion/bellevue-workersworn-out-from-treating-ebola-patient-face-stigma-outside-hospital.html?_r=0.
38
See Jeffrey M. Drazen et al., Ebola and Quarantine, 371 N. ENG. J. MED. 2029 (2014) (arguing
against quarantining healthcare workers who treat and control Ebola).
39
See Ebola Characteristics and Comparisons to Other Infectious Diseases, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(2016), http://kff.org/infographic/ebola-characteristics-and-comparisons-to-other-infectious-diseases
[http://perma.cc/M5VY-R8PQ].
40
See Enrique Chaves, Clinical Professor, University of Kansas, Lecture at the University of MissouriKansas City: American Medicine and the Panama Canal: Miasmas, Mosquitoes, and Malaria (Dec. 4, 2014)
(recording available at http://livestream.com/lindahall/medicine). Yellow Fever, also a hemmoraghic fever,
might be a particularly powerful comparison—its very name in Spanish meaning “black vomit”—with its
fifty percent mortality and lifetime immunity for survivors. Id. Some waves of Yellow Fever in Cuba are
reported to have killed as much as one third of the population. Id. Like Ebola, also a disease of poverty,
Yellow Fever was born in overcrowded housing and close living quarters with poor air circulation. Id.
41
Even between and among drug-resistant bacteria, we focus our attention on the anomalous transfer,
rather than the routine. See Sabrina Tavernise, Deadly CRE Germs Linked to Hard-to-Clean Medical
Scopes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/health/drug-resistant-germ-isspreading-by-hospital-device-federal-officials-say.html?_r=0.
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epidemic in 2014,42 this author could locate only one article discussing healthcareassociated infections in local facilities43 or the dangers of wide-scale bacterial
infections resistant to most known antibiotics overseas.44 Deaths from superbugs,
although on a vastly larger scale than deaths from Ebola, are distinctly less florid than
Ebola, often quicker, and leave a residue hidden from the human gaze, accounting for
much less public interest and scrutiny.
B. ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE AND MRSA
Antibiotic resistance has been described as everything from “the rise of bacteria
impervious to the new ‘cure,’”45 to staphylococcus aureaus (“staph”) strains that are
“essentially untreatable.”46 Resistance to Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(“MRSA”) specifically has been described as “the bacteria of the decade” for
responding only to very advanced antibiotics that were never meant to be a first-line
defense.47 “Superbugs,”48 drug-resistant bacteria,49 the problem of “antimicrobial
resistance,”50 and the description of the modern world as living in a “post-antibiotic
era”51 are descriptors that capture an aspect of the epidemic, but few place it in its
historical context.
Infectious diseases were far from unknown in the early years of the American
republic. As early as 1764, the town of Swansea, Massachusetts was petitioning the
legislature for ninety pounds52 to offset “great suffrance in the smallpox.”53 Smallpox
flared again in 177854 producing a lively public debate about the wisdom of town
sponsored smallpox inoculation.55 New York City’s 1832 cholera outbreak offers a
further example56 of early public discourse on infectious disease transmission.

42

I counted inches of news space devoted to Kansas City, MO preparedness for Ebola in Sept.-Nov.,

2014.

43

See Dan Margolies, Heartland Health Monitor: Truman Med Could Get Hit With Penalty Over
Infection Rates, KCUR (June 23, 2014), http://kcur.org/post/truman-med-could-get-hit-penalty-overinfection-rates#stream/0 [http://perma.cc/3VYB-2V77].
44
See Gardiner Harris, ’Superbugs’ Kill India’s Babies and Pose an Overseas Threat, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/world/asia/superbugs-kill-indias-babies-and-pose-anoverseas-threat.html?_r=0.
45
Katherine Xue, Superbug: An Epidemic Begins, HARV. MAG., May-June 2014 40, 40.
46
MARYN MCKENNA, SUPERBUG: THE FATAL MENACE OF MRSA 181 (Free Press, 1st. ed. 2010).
47
Brian Fung, MRSA On the Rise: Infections Have Doubled in 5 Years, ATLANTIC (July 30, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/07/mrsa-on-the-rise-infections-have-doubled-in-5years/260495/ [http://perma.cc/54UP-46M5].
48
The
Search
for
New
Antibiotics,
WBUR
(Feb.
17,
2014),
http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2014/02/17/search-new-antibiotics [http://perma.cc/R5WV-2UXC].
49
Shelley S. Magill et al., Multistate Point-Prevalence Survey of Healthcare–Associated Infections,
370 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1198, 1199 (2014).
50
INST. OF MED., ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: ISSUES AND OPTIONS, WORKSHOP REPORT (Polly F.
Harrison & Joshua Lederberg eds., 1998).
51
Xue, supra note 45, at 47.
52
A considerable sum in those days, roughly equivalent in purchasing power to 37,000 pounds or
60,000 dollars in 2014. See MEASURINGWORTH.COM, http://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/
relativevalue.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (providing a tool to find relative values).
53
HISTORY OF SWANSEA, MASSACHUSETTS, 1667-1917 (Otis Olney Wright ed., 1917),
http://archive.org/stream/historyofswansea00wrig/historyofswansea00wrig_djvu.txt.
54
MARY ANN MCDONALD, SOMERSET, MASSACHUSETTS: PORTRAIT OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
IN A NEW ENGLAND TOWN 79 (Spectator Publishing Corp., 1981).
55
Id.
56
Sonia Shah, How Unhealthy Paradigms Become Contagious, TEDMED (2014),
http://www.tedmed.com/talks/show?id=292928.
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The coming of antibiotics transformed bacterial infections from a scourge to a
largely-manageable and successfully-managed problem.57 But antimicrobial resistance
has been developing since the very invention of antibiotics. 58 Penicillin was discovered
in 1928.59 By 1945, the New York Times quoted Alexander Fleming predicting the
development of drug-resistant bacterial strains.60 “Penicillin-resistant strains of S.
aureus began appearing in hospitals just years after the drug was introduced.” 61
Multiple drug resistance developed later, but was observed in Japan as early as the
1950s.62 Since then, the race has not been to squelch bacterial infections altogether but
to remain one antibiotic ahead of the ever-morphing foe.
And, for decades now, we have been one antibiotic ahead of staph infections.63
MRSA is a form of staph infection that does not respond to first-line antibiotics,
meaning it is antibiotic resistant.64 Some people carry staph on their skin without any
danger, but these people are carriers of sorts, a status known as “being colonized.”65
The CDC estimates that one percent of the American population is colonized with
MRSA.66
MRSA is spread by skin-to-skin contact, and its danger is activated once it enters
the colonized individual’s skin or someone else’s skin. 67 Although we understand how
MRSA can be transmitted between individuals in society, “[o]ne of the major
knowledge gap[s] of infection control is the degree to which the inanimate
environment … actually drives the hospital infection process.” 68 MRSA is able to live
on the surface of hospital equipment for as long as nine months. 69 This means infection
preventionists ought to be just as interested in how MRSA lives in a hospital as they
are in how it enters the hospital. It also means that America’s healthcare facilities may
have an incomplete disinfection problem. Experiments with the use of ultra violet light
and the use of hydrogen peroxide fogging agents have been able to reduce MRSA rates
considerably70 but both approaches take careful effort and, most importantly,
substantial time.
57

Xue, supra note 45, at 40 (explaining the role of the “antibiotic revolution” in “trivializing” oncedeadly infections and paving the way for medical breakthroughs”).
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Gabrielle Canon, Antibiotics Are Spreading Like Crazy—and a Lot of Them Are About to Stop
Working, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 19, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/bluemarble/2015/09/antibiotic-resistance-report [http://perma.cc/LVG8-UFVP].
61
Xue, supra note 45, at 40.
62
Id. at 41.
63
See id. at 44.
64
MRSA Health Guide, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/
mrsa-infection/overview.html.
65
Id.
66
See CDC, MRSA and the Workplace, CDC.GOV, http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/mrsa/
[http://perma.cc/HFQ9-BQCC] (“While 33% of the population is colonized with staph (meaning that
bacteria are present, but not causing an infection with staph), approximately 1% is colonized with MRSA.”).
67
See CDC, Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) Infections, CDC.GOV (2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/mrsa/community/#q4 [http://perma.cc/AM35-HJMC].
68
Linda Poon, Stethoscopes Do As Much Dirty Work As Hands In Spreading Germs, NPR (Feb. 27,
2014, 1:05 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2014/02/27/283439909/stethoscopes-do-as-muchdirty-work-as-hands-in-spreading-germs.
69
How a Robot is Helping Reduce Hospital-Borne Infections, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Feb.
24 2014, 4:15 PM), http://www.rwjf.org/en/blogs/new-public-health/2014/02/how_r2d2_is_helping.html
[http://perma.cc/6BCH-HZ3S].
70
See Narrow-Spectrum UV Light May Reduce Surgical Infections, COLUM. UNIV. MED. CTR. (Oct.
16, 2013), http://newsroom.cumc.columbia.edu/blog/2013/10/16/narrow-spectrum-uv-light-may-reducesurgical-infections/ [http://perma.cc/P2JB-4KME]; Hydrogen Peroxide Vapor Enhances Hospital
Disinfection, INFECTION CONTROL TODAY (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/
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Once the staph enters the body, it can find a home in bone, blood, joint, or organ. 71
Staph in each of these locations is a very different matter from staph present on the
skin. Those with compromised immune systems are far more likely to have staph
present on the skin turn into one of these diseases. 72 MRSA is a story of staph
amplified from a benign skin condition to a deadly internal infection. 73
By 2002, a strain of MRSA had been identified as resistant to Vancomycin. 74 By
June 2007, the Committee to Reduce Infection Deaths (“RID”) declared MRSA as
endemic.75 Although acknowledging MRSA screening as the key to MRSA control,
universal screening for MRSA was delayed. 76 In retrospect, it is estimated that in the
1970s, two million Americans acquired nosocomial 77 infections and an estimated
100,000 deaths annually could be attributed to these hospital causes. 78
Between 2008 and 2014 the CDC reported “progress” on healthcare-associated
infection rates,79 though the annual cost hovered at $9.8 billion per year.80 Further,
healthcare-associated infections were linked to higher hospital re-admission rates81
which themselves were linked to higher mortality rates, 82 raising the question of
whether hospital-acquired infections were the cause or the symptom of increased
mortality.
The difference between then and now is that it is no longer clear that we are—or
can—stay ahead. The multi-drug resistant infections endemic has been a long time
coming.83 But we have entered an era that might be described as one marked by “the
end of antibiotics.”84 “In recent years, the rise of drug-resistant microbes has made the
antibiotics we use less effective and has increased the risk that an infectious disease
could get out of control.”85
Much of the healthcare discussion of antibiotic resistance has been pharmaceutical
lab focused, and, as a result, centered on understanding industrial and social forces that
news/2013/01/hydrogen-peroxide-vapor-enhances-hospital-disinfection.aspx [http://perma.cc/AT7X-G7QJ].
71
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(May
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2015),
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007261.htm [http://perma.cc/U4VU-FUMJ]. MRSA can
morph into different complications as the location and disease profile migrate. See Osteomyelitis, MAYO
CLINIC (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/osteomyelitis/basics/causes/con20025518 [http://perma.cc/CM86-XMUC].
72
U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED., MRSA, supra note 71.
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MRSA Health Guide, supra note 64.
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Xue, supra, note 45, at 47.
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Betsy McCaughney, Unnecessary Deaths: The Human and Financial Costs of Hospital Infections 1,
(2008),
http://hospitalinfection.org/ridbooklet.pdf
COMM. TO REDUCE INFECTION DEATHS
[http://perma.cc/VN79-YKYW].
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Id. at 9-10.
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Magill, supra note 49, at 1204.
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CDC, Preventing Healthcare-Associated Infections, CDC.GOV, http://www.cdc.gov/washington/
~cdcatWork/pdf/infections.pdf [http://perma.cc/2FKU-MJT6] (“Approximately 1.7 million HAIs occur in
U.S. hospitals each year, resulting in 99,000 deaths.”).
79
See, e.g., CDC, Progress Being Made in Infection Control in U.S. Hospitals; Continued
Improvements Needed, CDC.GOV (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2015/p0114-mrsahospitals-report.html [http://perma.cc/AKL2-W5DK].
80
Study: Hospital Infections Cost 9.8 Billion a Year, CBS NEWS (Sept. 2, 2013, 5:19 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/study-hospital-infections-cost-98-billion-a-year/
[http://perma.cc/LZ7L6XEP].
81
See Magill, supra note 49 (discussing a survey estimating the total number of hospital acquired
infections in U.S. acute care hospitals in 2011).
82
Id.at 1202.
83
See Xue, supra note 45, at 40 (“If the end is here, it has been a relatively long time coming.”).
84
Id.
85
James
Surowiecki,
Ebolanomics,
NEW
YORKER
(Aug.
25,
2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/25/ebolanomics [http://perma.cc/YX5G-Q8PA].

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2815049

402

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE

have drawn large pharmaceutical companies away from antibiotic discovery. 86 “Even
so, treatments for some pathogens remain worryingly sparse, and the continually
evolving nature of bacteria means that constant cycles of drug discovery will be
necessary for the foreseeable future if medical care is to remain ahead of antibiotic
resistance.”87
The focus on an as-needed fix has necessarily precluded a “fix it first” approach
targeting the sources and transmittal of bacterial infections themselves. And, the recent
spread of new generation antibiotics to widespread use in the food supply compounded
the pressure to develop ever more new antibiotics suitable for deployment against
multi-drug resistant infections in humans. 88 Resistance to antibiotics has historically
developed within three years of a product’s introduction. 89 This means our human
fixes must be developed at an exponentially faster pace, in an attempt to outstrip the
abbreviated lifespan of each successive antibiotic fix. 90
The biggest problem with this model of antibiotic development is that it is
contrary to the financial incentives built into our drug development system. Our drug
development system’s financial incentives are focused on promoting drugs that will be
taken for long periods of time and by large numbers of people, 91 rather than those to be
taken for time-limited periods by relatively small numbers of individuals. However,
those few individuals may represent the point of disease entry into the larger group.
From a communicable disease perspective, this is similar to the interest we all have in
seeing the relatively few Americans among us with tuberculosis receive the treatment
they need, precisely so that tuberculosis case numbers remains relatively low. 92
The new antibiotic development system design is focused on the clinical
encounter when the risk to anyone can only be best understood by a public or group
health analysis. Even more troubling, the relevant group for the group health analysis
may extend far beyond American borders.93
C. THE EPIDEMIC OF HEALTHCARE-RELATED INFECTIONS
As a nation, Americans are aware of the transmission of viruses and infections.
Although the country has not reached a consensus on the role of government compared

86
Id. (“If a drug company did invent a powerful new antibiotic, we wouldn’t want it to be widely
prescribed, because the goal would be to delay resistance.”).
87
Xue, supra note 45, at 44.
88
See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, How to Develop New Antibiotics, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/opinion/how-to-develop-new-antibiotics.html.
89
Xue, supra note 45, at 44.
90
Id. (explaining that vancomycin, the last-line drug against MRSA, has “enjoyed a relatiely lengthy
life” because it had a more limited use when first manufactured than penicillin and other related antibiotics).
91
Surowiecki, supra note 85.
92
See American Thoracic Society, CDC, Treatment of Tuberculosis, MMRW RECOMMENDATIONS
AND
REPORTS (June 20, 2003), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5211a1.htm
[http://perma.cc/L7WG-5HT6].
93
See Margaret A. Hamburg et al., Germs Go Global: Why Emerging Infectious Diseases are a Threat
to America 9, TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH & ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (2008),
http://healthyamericans.org/assets/files/GermsGoGlobal.pdf [http://perma.cc/T5TE-7GGC]; see also Jeffrey
Levi et al., Outbreaks: Protecting Americans from Infectious Diseases, TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH &
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (2014), http://healthyamericans.org/assets/files/Final%20Outbreaks%
202014%20Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/X29N-VDLP] (exploring what the Ebola outbreak outside of the
U.S. reveals about the adequacy of U.S. infectious disease controls).
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to the role of free markets in promoting something as basic as better hand hygiene
among food handlers, for instance,94 there is an ongoing debate.
An entire industry built around Purell® and alcohol-based cleaners95 has grown up
to assuage our fears of acquiring communicable diseases and viruses in public
spaces.96 All of this occurs in the face of the fact that it is widely publicized that the
problem may be with our sterilization and cleaning protocols, when “clean enough”
stops being just that.97 As Lawrence Gostin has noted, “[y]ou can’t put a cellophane
wrapper around a whole region and expect to keep germs out.” 98 Indeed, even where
the risk is not substantial, we obsess over what are popularly known as “germs” 99 or,
less commonly, microbes.
Recent outbreaks of Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriacease (“CRE”) in
California attracted public attention, however briefly, about the potential for
contamination of medical equipment.100 But even there, the focus was on
“inadequately sterilized medical scopes”101 and on the surely anomalous nature of the
outbreak. Eventually, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) asked device
makers about the risk of drug-resistant bacteria outliving device maker-approved
cleaning methods.102 The agency thus acknowledged that duodenoscopes have been
implicated in outbreaks at hospitals in Park Ridge, Illinois and Seattle long before the
attention-rousing outbreak at Ronald Reagan U.C.L.A. Medical Center.103 Indeed,
CRE outbreaks associated with hard-to-clean duodenoscopes continue to be reported,
even more recently at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles.104 But the device
makers’ responses were not so widely reported, nor was the FDA’s recent requirement
that some duodenoscope manufacturers conduct post-market research on how the
94
See Humberto Sanchez, Thom Tillis: Keep Government Out of the Bathroom, ROLL CALL (Feb. 3,
2015,
12:37
PM),
http://blogs.rollcall.com/wgdb/thom-tillis-keep-government-out-of-the-bathroom
[http://perma.cc/2YLM-RJUB].
95
C. Claiborne Ray, Hand-Wringing Over Bacteria, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/science/10qna.html (explaining that “even the recommended kinds of
sanitizers do not eliminate all germs” and that “[h]and sanitizers that are not based on alcohol . . . are both
less effective and slower to act than alcohol . . . present[ing] a risk of producing bacterial resistance”).
96
See
David
Owen,
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Feasts,
NEW
YORKER
(Nov.
3,
2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/03/floating-feasts [http://perma.cc/5ZZB-WA4P] (“Most
alcohol-based hand cleansers are only minimally effective against norovirus, but a few years ago the
company that makes Purell introduced and extra-powerful version, called VF481, especially for cruise ships,
casinos, hospitals, and other high-risk environments.”).
97
See Steven Ross Johnson, UCLA: Endoscope Manufacturers’ Reprocessing Protocols Won’t Stop
HEALTHCARE
(Feb.
19,
2015),
Superbug
Infections,
MODERN
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150219/NEWS/150219878 [http://perma.cc/9J44-7VD3].
98
Infected Workers, Slow Deployment, No Vaccines: Ebola Response Shows Pitfalls of Privatized
Health
(Democracy
Now
broadcast
Oct.
15,
2014)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.democracynow.org/2014/10/15/infected_workers_slow_deployment_no_vaccines
[http://perma.cc/ZQY6-667X]).
99
Nicholas Bakalar, Go Ahead, Use the Restroom, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014, 9:33 AM),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/go-ahead-use-the-restroom
(containing
reader
comments
perseverating on the presence of vaginal organisms on women’s toilet seats and not the presence of skinassociated Staphylococcus aureus, a common cause of skin infections).
100
See, e.g., Anahad O’Connor, California: More Drug-Resistant Cases are Linked to Medical
Devices, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/us/california-more-drug-resistantcases-are-linked-to-medical-device.html.
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N.Y. Times Editorial Board, When Medical Devices Spread Superbugs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/opinion/when-medical-devices-spread-superbugs.html.
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Catherine Saint Louis, After Deadly Infections, F.D.A. Asks Device Makers About Cleaning
Methods, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/26/us/after-deadly-infections-fdaasks-device-makers-about-cleaning-methods.html.
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duodenoscope disinfection process actually works in medical settings as opposed to in
the lab.105
Perhaps the longer denouement of the story exceeds the attention span of the news
cycle. It may also reflect an accurate assessment of actual risk. It is worth noting,
though, that the underlying discussion of antibiotic resistance also fades with the fade
of the focus on the outbreak. 106 We are crisis-driven in our outlook and short-sighted in
our calculation of risk.
Inevitably, the question arises about how widespread the problem of health-careassociated infections is. Just as predictably, the consensus answer is that “we do not
know with any certainty.”107 Moreover, we do not know whether our latest movement
toward mandated reporting of things like CRE cases to the CDC is the answer, 108 or
whether assigning “superbug” reporting decisions and regimens to the discretion of the
states raises or reduces incidence or transmission.109
We are also not entirely clear on the causes of the epidemic. 110 As an epidemic
without borders, healthcare-associated infections are hard to define, track, and
eliminate.111 In short, as Bernard Black and David Hyman have made clear, not all
change is progress.112
Ebola epidemics may best be characterized as epidemics driven by poverty. 113 Our
healthcare-associated infections epidemic might best be understood as an epidemic
driven by wealth.114 Ebola originated in the bush and, most probably, it leapt from fruit
bats—who are lifelong hosts of Ebola as a chronic disease—to humans and primates—
who serve as relatively short-lived, and therefore inefficient, hosts. 115 Ebola epidemics
105
Steven Ross Johnson, Duodenoscope Makers Ordered to Study Device-Cleaning Processes,
MODERN HEALTHCARE (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20151005/news/
151009969 [http://perma.cc/8J8B-9C9Q].
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See Jon Hamilton, Why California’s Superbug Outbreak Isn’t As Scary As It Seems, NPR (Feb. 20,
2015, 5:49 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/02/19/387552431/heres-why-californiassuperbug-outbreak-isnt-as-scary-as-it-seems [http://perma.cc/ACD4-3SPX].
107
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http://www.cdc.gov/HAI/pdfs/hai/infections_deaths.pdf [http://perma.cc/H248-DUJS].
108
Calls for Superbug Reporting Rules Increase Amid Outbreaks, CAL. HEALTHLINE (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2015/3/9/calls-for-superbug-reporting--rules-increase-amidoutbreaks [http://perma.cc/3HKW-2SFN].
109
Id. (explaining that the CDC maintains that “[u]ltimately, the decision should be based on what
makes sense for prevention in a particular state” without explaining why such a diffuse approach makes
sense with infections that do not respect state borders).
110
Indeed, we do not know if healthcare-associated infections are the problem or one manifestation of
a larger problem with skin infections in general. See Roni Caryn Rabin, Single Dose of Antibiotic Found
Effective in Quelling MRSA, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/health/singledose-of-antibiotic-found-effective-in-quelling-mrsa.html (noting that rates of skin infection are on the rise,
with an estimated fifteen million cases per year in the United States).
111
In fact, it can fairly be said that there is no genuine consensus on the number of Americans who die
each year from antibiotic-resistant infections, with the CDC itself conceding that some of its numbers are
based on what might be called cautious counting, including only deaths definitively considered to be
attributable to these infections. See CDC Studies Assess Effects of Antibiotic Resistant Infections, MRSA,
CAL. HEALTHLINE DAILY EDITION (Sept. 17, 2013), http://californiahealthline.org/morning-breakout/cdcstudies-assess-effects-of-antibioticresistant-infections-mrsa [http://perma.cc/SUD4-KXSU].
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Bernard S. Black & David A. Hyman, Public Reporting of Hospital Infection Rates: Not All Change
is Progress (forthcoming).
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David Orentlicher, Ebola: A Problem of Poverty Rather Than Health, PRAWFS BLAWG (Oct. 28,
2014, 10:09 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/10/ebola-a-problem-of-poverty-ratherthan-health.html [http://perma.cc/H8MN-PGTU].
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See CDC, About Ebola Virus, supra note 28.
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are thus products of war and poverty because increasing numbers of West Africans are
driven to live in closer proximity to bush meat. 116
Americans, by contrast, are increasingly estranged from our food supply, living
further, physically and mentally, from the sources of our meat.117 Americans are
astonished to learn that our meat sources receive massive doses of antibiotics to
promote growth as well as health. 118 And it is in the matrix created by those antibiotics
that the drug-resistant superbugs of hospital-acquired infections evolve.119 From this
perspective, the Ebola story and the story surrounding healthcare-associated infections
are both stories about modernity and its effect on food supply. 120
Acknowledging the guide post of “primum non nocere” (“first, do no harm”)121
clarifies the problem of defining harm, the chances of inflicting harm, and the duty we
impose on someone to minimize the risk of that harm.122 Balancing risk of
transmission with severity of the effect of transmission123 is particularly complex in the
case of healthcare-associated infections because few data are collected on either
dimension of the risk analysis.124
Americans are not even certain of the size of our healthcare-associated infection
epidemic. An estimated 75,000 people died from what were described as hospitalacquired infections in 2011.125 In that year, an estimated 722,000 hospital infections

116

See Kathleen A. Alexander et al., What Factors Might Have Led to the Emergence of Ebola in West
Africa?, 9 PLOS NEGLECTED TROPICAL DISEASES 1, 11-12 (2015).
117
See USDA, 2012 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, PRELIMINARY REPORT HIGHLIGHTS, US FARMS &
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[http://perma.cc/N8PD-9V6J] (“In 2012, the United States had 2.1 million farms – down 4.3 percent from
the last agricultural Census in 2007. This continues a long-term trend of fewer farms.”)
118
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N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/health/cdc-report-finds-23000-deaths-ayear-from-antibiotic-resistant-infections.html?_r=0. The government has estimated that more than 70
percent of antibiotics in the United States are given to animals. Id. Companies use them to prevent sickness
when animals are packed together in ways that breed infection. Id. They also use them to make animals
grow faster, though federal authorities are trying to stop that. Id. According to one CDC report, “much of
antibiotic use in animals is unnecessary and inappropriate and makes everyone less safe.” Id.
119
Id.
120
California’s recent decision to move forward with legislation addressing the management of
antibiotic use in animals may be the harbinger of change in this regard. See Rudolf H. Beese & Phillip
Bradley, Limiting Antibiotic Use in Animals, How States are Taking Charge, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 22, 2015),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=744600e7-b956-4934-95bf-7ba3925bdf7a
[http://perma.cc/3SN2-YVA4].
121
See Cedric M. Smith, Origin and Uses of Primum Non Nocere—Above All, Do No Harm!, 45 J.
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 371, 371 (2005). Also known as the “Hippocratic injunction to do no harm,”
primum non nocere is an important phrase in clinical pharmacology and medical education. Id. Although its
actual author is disputed, this phrase “remains a potent reminder that every medical and pharmacological
decision carries the potential for harm.” Id.
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Kate Murphy,
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(Nov. 8, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/sunday-review/the-ethics-of-infection.html?_r=0
(exploring
the
question of whether and to what extent citizens have an “ethical obligation” to prevent the spread of
infection and sickness).
123
See, e.g., Tijs J. Tobias, et al., Association Between Transmission Rate and Disease Severity for
Actinobacillus Pleuropneumoniae Infection in Pigs, 44 VETERINARY RES. (2013) (studying the connection
between rate of transmission and severity of disease due to A. pleuropneuomoniae exposure in pigs, causing
respiratory illness).
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2014),
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occurred.126 The CDC estimates that, each year, more than two million Americans
developed antibiotic-resistant infections while hospitalized, resulting in 23,000
deaths.127 Hospital-based estimates suggest that trends are improving, and that the
curve is being bent.128 Medicare data on Hospital Acquired Conditions (“HACs”)—
including hospital-acquired infections—show an overall reduction in HACs between
2010 and 2012.129
But this data on HACs are of limited usefulness. They are entirely based on selfreports that are typically derived from patient chart documentation, 130 rather than from
epidemiological studies.131 In the context of hospital-acquired catheter-associated
urinary tract infection (“UTI”) rates, self-reported data were shown to represent only a
small fraction of the epidemiologically-defined true rate.132 This indicates that parties
cannot entirely agree on the scope of our problem. 133
Polling data indicate that eighteen percent of Americans have personally
experienced a hospital-acquired infection or have a close family member who has
experienced one.134 Yet, current media coverage is on the trend of improvement in
infection control135 rather than on the absolute cost of HACs in human life, human
suffering, and healthcare dollars.136 And, though we are apparently relieved that the
trend—on reported health-care-associated infections, at least—is favorable, we are
content not to ask too many questions concerning root cause analyses.137
126
127

Id.
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128
See Robert Lowes, Hospital-Acquired Conditions and Readmits on Downswing, MEDSCAPE (May 7,
2014), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/824782 [http://perma.cc/77DH-YWCK] (finding a 9%
reduction in HACS, saving almost 15,000 lives).
129
Id.
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Healthcare-Associated Infections, MEDICARE.gov, http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/Data/
Healthcare-Associated-Infections.html
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self-reporting
mechanism and its flaws).
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See, Sanjay Saint et al., Catheter-Associated Urinary Tract Infection and the Medicare Rule
Changes, 150 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 877, 882 (2009) (explaining the lack of incentive to accurately
report catheter-associated urinary tract infections, providing an incomplete record for potential
epidemiological studies).
133
See Tavernise, supra note 118 (explaining that the wide discrepancy between a 2007 CDC report
estimating that 100,000 people die of hospital-acquired infections per year and a 2014 CDC report finding
that the number is only 23,000 people per year is due to the CDC’s subsequent exclusion of “cases in which
a drug-resistant infection was present but not necessarily the cause of death”).
134
CONSUMER REPORTS NATIONAL RESEARCH CENTER, PATIENT EXPERIENCE 3 (Mar. 2009),
http://consumersunion.org/pdf/medical-error-poll-309.pdf [http://perma.cc/SU3M-D7RB].
135
See CDC, Progress Being Made in Infection Control in U.S. Hospitals; Continued Improvements
Needed, CDC.GOV (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2015/p0114-mrsa-hospitalsreport.html [http://perma.cc/6DZN-9RUM] (edited Feb. 24, 2015).
136
See Robert Preidt, Hospital-Acquired Infection Rates Declining, CBSNEWS (Jan. 14, 2015, 5:07
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hospital-acquired-infection-rates-declining/ [http://perma.cc/JL6CDALP] (calling for “continued efforts to improve infection control in U.S. hospitals”); see also Alice Park,
Here’s What U.S. Health Experts Learned from Ebola One Year Later, TIME (Sept. 24, 2015)
http://time.com/4047029/ebola-lessons-one-year-later/ [http://perma.cc/84UY-JERD] (arguing that we can’t
wait for an emergency to put money into preventative measures).
137
In this, we have something in common with those West African cultures that will not or cannot
change burial rituals involving prolonged close contact with dead bodies. See Abby Haglage, Kissing the
BEAST
(Aug.
13,
2014,
5:55
AM),
Corpses
in
Ebola
Country,
DAILY
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/13/kissing-the-corpses-in-ebola-country.html
[http://perma.cc/8BRM-QNRR]. The report indicating that seventy percent of new cases of Ebola in Sierra
Leone are directly linked to such traditional burials, is met with the same sense of fatalism we greet the news
of our own hospital acquired infections pandemic. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Despite Aid Push, Ebola Is Raging
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D. EBOLA HAS SHINED A LIGHT ON PREVIOUSLY-DARK CORNERS
People have limited attention spans, and Americans are famously in a hurry. 138
“Speed makes savings” is more our mantra than “haste makes waste.” 139 The fear of
the spread of Ebola has highlighted how infection prevention and control measures are
under-resourced in America’s acute care facilities.140 The identified solution appears to
focus on identifying those facilities prepared to meet the highest standards of infection
prevention and control, rather than a focus on the failure to have infection prevention
and control measures in place in all healthcare settings. 141 Infection preventionists,
eager to not waste a good crisis, are promoting infection prevention products as Ebola
protectants, rather than as protectants against more common kinds of healthcareassociated infections.142 It is this sole focus on Ebola that allows us to remain
estranged from the reality of our own present epidemic.
For example, Ebola’s presence, however limited, in American acute care facilities
has brought to light the limitations of current infection control procedures in American
hospitals. Texas Health Presbyterian Hospitals’ failure to identify and implement one
consistent practice for disposing of medical waste in the face of conflicting agency
guidance143 raised important and yet unanswered questions about these practices vis-àvis other healthcare-associated infections.144
Yet little has been done to extend lessons learned from Ebola transmission to nonEbola infection disease control. In this aspect, Americans have more in common with
Western Africa than previously thought. In Western Africa, a focus on a single disease
often disrupts health systems.145 In America, however, a focus on one disease causes
us to focus on specialty care for that disease alone, without placing that disease’s
spread in the larger context of infection-control failures in American acute care
facilities.146 Thus, paradoxically, an isolated focus on Ebola might foster an increase

in Sierra Leone, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/world/africa/despite-aidpush-ebola-is-raging-in-sierra-leone.html.
138
See 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 887-96, (Henry Reed Trans., Floating
Press 2009) (1840).
139
Arguably, the goal of rapid acute care facility bed turnover finds its bottleneck at the housekeeping
department’s limitations on room turnover cleaning capacity. See Louis Profeta, ER Doctor: What Scares
Me Even More Than Ebola, An ER Doctor Writes, TRENT (Oct. 27, 2014),
http://www.thetrentonline.com/er-doctor-scares-even-ebola-dr-louis-m-profeta/
[http://perma.cc/3XS9]
(noting that “[t]he regulations, protocols and procedures put into place to clean a room are so extensive that
rapid room turnover was next to impossible with the current staffing model” and that the lowest paid
hospital workers are put in the highly pressured position of advancing room turnover).
140
See Sabriya Rice, Hospitals Revamp Infection Control Amid Ebola Scare, MODERN HEALTHCARE
(Oct. 26, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20141026/NEWS/310249942
[http://perma.cc/S8NQ].
141
See 35 U.S. Hospitals Designated as Ebola Treatment Centers—CDC Trains and Assesses Ebola
Hospital Readiness in Collaborative Effort, GOVDELIVERY (Dec. 2, 2014 4:02 PM),
http://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USCDC/bulletins/e05f53 [http://perma.cc/F7M9-D2YM].
142
See Beth Kutscher, Ebola Spurs Higher Demand for Infection-Control Products, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20141025/NEWS/310249943
[http://perma.cc/7SM7] (describing “greater demand for infection-control products as hospitals prepare for
possible Ebola cases in their facilities”).
143
Kevin Sack & Manny Fernandez, Delay in Dallas Ebola Cleanup as Workers Balk at Task, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/us/dallas-ebola-case-thomas-duncancontacts.html.
144
See id.
145
David Sanders, Address at the University of Missouri, Kansas City: The New Health Economy: A
Global Perspective (Dec. 11, 2014).
146
See WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, FACT SHEET: U.S. RESPONSE TO THE EBOLA
EPIDEMIC IN WEST AFRICA (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/16/fact-
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rather than a decrease in healthcare-associated infections. The rise of command and
control regulation on infection prevention measures for Ebola alone in the United
States may represent a defeat for improved general infection control in acute care
facilities.147
Americans also express restlessness as the media moves from issue to issue with
lightning speed, never minding that complex problems may require complex
solutions.148 Rather, Americans admire “the hack,” or the unexpectedly elegant and
simple solution, over the painstaking resolution.149 Because the public loses interest in
complex problems, 150 the numbers of victims of our healthcare-associated infections
are hard to comprehend, 151 in stark contrast to what was the daily drumbeat of cases of
Ebola in the United States.152
Once something is described as endemic,153 there also comes a sense of
inevitability. And so, many have become inured to healthcare-associated infections, all
the while miscalculating our risk of dying from one HAC in comparison to our risk of
dying from Ebola.154 Public health research tells us that we are poor calculators of
health risk, inclined toward unrealistic optimism when comparing ourselves to others
when assessing relative risk. 155 Americans focus on the risks thought to be most
specific to us,156 and this is, in part, an article about how healthcare-associated
infections have developed to appear beyond our control and beyond our remedy. 157
Still, this American optimism158 is almost as incurable and immutable as some
infectious diseases themselves. Richard Preston of The New Yorker reported that fatal
mistakes have been made in preventing Ebola transmission in the healthcare context,
sheet-us-response-ebola-epidemic-west-africa [http://perma.cc/BSL5-DXPN] (outlining, without mention of
infection-control in acute care facilities, the new resources deployed to help the U.S. respond to Ebola).
147
Sanders, supra note 145.
148
See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 138, at 887-96.
149
See id.
150
See id.
151
See Ilyse Resnick et al., Examining the Representation and Understanding of Large Magnitudes
Using
the
Hierarchical
Alignment
Model
of
Analogical
Reasoning
917
(2012),
http://mindmodeling.org/cogsci2012/papers/0167/paper0167.pdf [http://perma.cc/E8RV-QAEL] (arguing
humans struggle to comprehend values of extremely large or small magnitudes).
152
How Many Ebola Patients Have Been Treated Outside of Africa?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/07/31/world/africa/ebola-virus-outbreak-qa.html.
153
Endemic,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/endemic
[http://perma.cc/26MG-J3GA] (defining “endemic” as “natural to or characteristic of a specific people or
place; native; indigenous,” or “belonging exclusively or confined to a particular place”).
154
See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 138, at 714 (“[Americans] have all a lively faith in the perfectibility
of man; they are of opinion that the effects of the diffusion of knowledge must necessarily be advantageous,
and the consequences of ignorance fatal . . . ”); see also Rebecca Jacobson, These Six Diseases Should
NEWSHOUR
(Oct.
8,
2014,
3:43
PM),
Worry
You
More
Than
Ebola,
PBS
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/six-diseases-actually-worry/ [http://perma.cc/S5K3-4XEL] (arguing
that “diseases we should be worried about” include Enterovirus and Measles, not Ebola) (emphasis
included)).
155
See THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF HIV INFECTION 6 (John B. Pryor & Glenn D. Reeder eds., 2015).
156
Id.; see also 2 PSYCHOLOGY AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENIUM 253 (Claes von Hofsten & Lars
Bäckman, eds., 2002) (“[R]isks that are more cognitively available through personal experience or media
coverage tend to be overestimated.”); Jacobson, supra note 154 (illustrating that what we imagine is most
specific to us does not always reflect what we should fear most).
157
The fact that the response to Ebola largely focused on individual protection via means including
personal protection equipment as opposed to general methods to reduce the spread to the general population
may be symptomatic of our feelings that the spread of healthcare associated infections is beyond our control.
See Jaimy Lee, Setting the Research Priorities for Ebola, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Nov. 1, 2014),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20141101/MAGAZINE/311019948/setting-the-researchpriorities-for-ebola [http://perma.cc/S5K3-4XEL].
158
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 138, at 714.
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but that we “will learn” because “the warriors against Ebola understand that they face
a long struggle against a formidable enemy.”159 Yet the struggle against healthcare
associated infections has not, in the past, benefited from the same American
triumphalism. The fact that Ebola captures the collective American imagination, while
the public barely knows that one in six American hospitals struggles with infection
control160 is a tragedy.
The arrival of Ebola on our shores provided an opportunity to begin educating the
public. Public awareness of Texas Presbyterian Hospital’s 161 apparent inability to
contain Ebola heightened concerns about poor infection and virus control procedures,
as well as poor training in general.162
But the public was, apparently, persuaded that the problem must not be in
infection and virus control training,163 and called for Ebola-response teams.164 That
took pressure off of calls for general improvement in infection control, 165 to the
disappointment of some.166 A 2011 study in the New England Journal of Medicine
traced our infection control problems to less than full compliance with the prosaic
prevention measures of hand washing and barrier procedures to protect the patient. 167
But still no public outcry ensued.168
Studies and statistics emphasizing risks to patient do not compel public attention
the same way as studies and statistics emphasizing risk to healthcare workers. This is
counter-intuitive as an analysis of risk. Many more of us are likely to be patients in
acute care facilities than to be healthcare workers in them. Yet this narrative of risk
stokes the American narrative of individual heroism. Time’s 2014 person of the year
was an individual in full Ebola containment suit. 169 This demonstrated the kind of
dramatic individual bravery that we prize over the slow methodical transformation of
group practice that is necessary to reduce the larger risks to patients.

159

Richard Preston, The Ebola Wars: How Genomics Research Can Help Contain the Outbreak, NEW
YORKER
(Oct.
27,
2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/27/ebola-wars
[http://perma.cc/D6G2-XVS4].
160
Jordan Rau, Hospitals’ Struggles to Beat Back Familiar Infections Began Before Ebola Arrived,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 21, 2014), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/hospitals-struggles-to-beat-backfamiliar-infections-began-before-ebola-arrived/ [http://perma.cc/A9HF-VFJ2].
161
See Chelsea Rice, Dallas Hospital Defends Treatment of Ebola Patient, BOSTON.COM (Oct. 9, 2014,
6:48
PM),
http://www.boston.com/health/2014/10/09/dallas-hospital-defends-treatment-ebolapatient/GJQ0cfpZUiZUHs9iMqGO3K/story.html [http://perma.cc/D7P8-WAWF].
162
Kevin Sack, Downfall for Hospital Where Ebola Spread, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/us/infamy-for-dallas-hospital-where-virus-spread.html.
163
See, e.g., Robert Pearl, Ebola Response Reveals Double Standard In U.S. Healthcare, FORBES (Dec.
11,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2014/12/11/ebola-double-standard/#7b83e4707f46
(“Some of the same leaders who demand hazmat suits to protect healthcare workers from Ebola have done
little to address the risks involved when healthcare workers don’t wash their hands.”).
164
See Lisa Schnirring, CDC to Deploy Ebola Response Team to Help Hospitals, CIDRAP NEWS (Oct.
14, 2014), http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2014/10/cdc-deploy-ebola-response-team-helphospitals [http://perma.cc/X78P-UFSF].
165
Judy Stone, Why Ebola Is a Wake Up for Infection Control, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN: MOLECULES TO
MED. BLOG (Oct. 23, 2014), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/molecules-to-medicine/2014/10/23/whyebola-is-a-wake-up-for-infection-control/ [http://perma.cc/98AU-ZYF9].
166
See id.
167
Rau, supra note 160.
168
But see Anemona Hartocollis, With Money at Risk, Hospitals Push Staff to Wash Hands, N.Y.
TIMES (May 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/nyregion/hospitals-struggle-to-get-workers-towash-their-hands.html.
169
Nancy Gibbs, Person of the Year: The Choice, TIME (Dec. 10, 2014), http://time.com/time-personof-the-year-ebola-fighters-choice/ [http://perma.cc/5CP8-NM5B].
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III. NOT EBOLA BUT MRSA IS THE DISEASE AGENT OF THE DECADE
A. THE HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED INFECTIONS EPIDEMIC
MRSA, not Ebola, is the “bacteria of the decade.”170 The rate of MRSA infections
has doubled at United States academic hospitals between 2003 and 2008.171 Hospitalacquired MRSA infections are likely down over this interval, 172 but hospital-associated
MRSA infections are likely up.173 This raises the possibility that communityassociated MRSA is making the leap to the healthcare context, and thus driving a wave
of healthcare-associated MRSA.174 We do not systematically screen for active MRSA
infection at hospital admission, or for that matter, for hospital employment.175 Thus, it
is unclear whether patients who arrive with and bring MRSA into the healthcare
context arrived with a full-blown MRSA infection or just MRSA colonization.
Until very recently there were no national targets or benchmarks for hospitalacquired MRSA.176 We have long left it to each facility to measure, report, and
remediate as they see fit.177 Even with publicly issued reports with titles like
“Unnecessary Deaths,”178 we find cries to focus on controlling what are seen as
relatively run-of-the-mill healthcare-associated infections to be not very compelling.
Colonization represents the extent of latent potential for future illness, 179 both for
the individual colonized or for some other individual. 180 Yet our patient billing data
historically has focused only on present illness.181 It often subsumes even the
documentable presence of active MRSA under the primary code of some other disease
or disorder.182 In short, it is entirely possible that reported MRSA infections exclude
all MRSA colonizations. Moreover, reported infections may exclude many, if not
most, active MRSA diagnoses for which active MRSA is the sole diagnosis. 183
170

Fung, supra note 47.
Id.
Id.; see also CDC, General Information About MRSA in Healthcare Settings, CDC.GOV (Apr. 3,
2014), http://www.cdc.gov/mrsa/healthcare/index.html [http://perma.cc/6LJN-Y5M5] (“Invasive MRSA
infections that began in hospitals declined 54% between 2005 and 2011, with 30,800 fewer severe MRSA
infections.”).
173
See Fung, supra note 47.
174
Id.
175
See U. CHI. MED. MRSA RES. CTR., For Infection Control Professionals – FAQs (2016),
http://mrsa-research-center.bsd.uchicago.edu/infection_control/faq.html
[http://perma.cc/H2W9-QVRB]
(explaining that some states require screening upon hospital admission, but that the general consensus is that
“hospital workers should only be cultured when they are clearly implicated in MRSA transmission”).
176
See MASS. GEN. HOSP., MRSA Incidence, http://qualityandsafety.massgeneral.org/measures/
linemeasurement.aspx?id=630 [http://perma.cc/3U6X-N4UW].
177
See, e.g., id. (showing, as a result, that MGH can only compare itself to itself over time or
longitudinally and not to facilities of similar size, patient mix, and payor mix).
178
Betsy McCaughey, COMMITTEE TO REDUCE INFECTION DEATHS, Unnecessary Deaths: The Human
and Financial Costs of Hospital Infections 1 (3d ed. 2008), http://www.hospitalinfection.org/ridbooklet.pdf
[http://perma.cc/TXP3-EZZM].
179
C.L. Abad et al., Does the Nose Know? An Update on MRSA Decolonization Strategies, 15
CURRENT INFECTIOUS DISEASE REP. 455, 462 (2013) (noting that decolonization efforts “have not been
consistent or applicable to all populations”).
180
See Drazen, supra note 38, at 2 (describing New York’s quarantine of healthcare workers returning
from Ebola-threatened regions of the world in order to stem spread of potential colonized bacteria).
181
See Michael Z. David et al., Increasing Burden of Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus
Hospitalizations at US Academic Medical Centers, 2003-2008, 33 INFECTION CONTROL HOSP.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 782, 787 (2012).
182
See id.
183
See Pete Eisler & Morgan Fecto, MRSA Bacteria Target Crowded Places With Poor Hygiene, USA
TODAY (Dec. 18, 2013, 3:12 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/16/mrsa-emerging171
172
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Shockingly, we have become inured to reports of deaths from healthcareassociated infections. There is some evidence that the public is beginning to reconceive of the modern acute care hospital as a locus of disease rather than of hope. 184
Healthcare-associated infections are not the only current healthcare crisis where public
outrage seems to be conspicuously muted.185 It is unclear whether this is a result of
changing provider-patient power relationships, scientific illiteracy, hard-wired
aversions to facing unpleasant medical truths, or other factors. Wise counsel is that
hospitals and healthcare facilities are dangerous places. Thus, they are to be
avoided.186 Patient narratives commending a “personal policy of surgical
abstinence”187 are striking.
Persuaded that the proliferation of hand sanitizer dispensers188 will sufficiently
immunize us, Americans simultaneously confront our own worst fears of a “super
bug”189 while participating in our communal lives, including the highly communal and
congregate experiences of acute care hospitalization and nursing home residence much
as we always have since the rise of these two healthcare institutions in the twentieth
century.190 However, hand sanitizer may have immunized us from some of our worst
fears about healthcare-associated infections without immunizing us from the reality of
them.
Americans are simultaneously obsessed with hand sanitizer dispensers, and at the
same time, concerned that the government may too strongly promote hand washing—
or is simply ambivalent about the role of poor hand hygiene in the transmission of
communicable diseases. Therefore, Americans entertain public debate about removing
public health warnings in food service bathrooms to remind employees to wash their
hands before returning to work. 191
Interestingly, the latest Ebola epidemic has also proven intractable for some of the
same reasons, including poor hand hygiene, failure to screen consistently and
thoroughly, and distrust of healthcare providers.192 One explanation of why it has been
in-schools-prisons-athletic-facilities/4013153/ [http://perma.cc/P2YW-UAAE] (describing a new form of
community-acquired MRSA that “caus[es] hundreds of thousands of infections a year that go unreported and
untracked by public health agencies.”).
184
See EZEKIEL EMANUEL, REINVENTING AMERICAN HEALTHCARE 22-23 (Public Affairs 2014); see
also Concerned MD, Comment to When a Stressful Hospital Stay Makes You Sick, N.Y. TIMES: WELL (June
12,
2014),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/when-a-stressful-hospital-stay-makes-yousick/?hpw&rref=health (“Hospitals are dangerous places. If at all possible, avoid being admitted. If
admitted, get out as soon as possible. And I say that as a physician.”).
185
See, e.g., Ira Byock, Opinion, Dying Shouldn’t Be So Brutal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2015),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/dying-shouldnt-be-so-brutal/ (calling for public “outrage”
at the “unsafe state” of hospice care).
186
See Concerned MD, supra note 184; Abagail Zuger, Revolving Doors at Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES:
WELL (June 9, 2014, 4:36 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/09/revolving-doors-at-hospitals/
[http://perma.cc/4BWF-8QUK] (see subscriber comments); see also Anemona Hartocollis, Measles
Outbreak May Have Spread in Medical Facilities, a New York City Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/nyregion/measles-outbreak-in-new-york-may-have-spread-inmedical-facilities.html.
187
Kerry O’Connell, Two Arms, Two Choices: If Only I’d Known Then What I Know Now, 31 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 1895, 1898 (2012).
188
See David Owen, Hands Across America: The Rise of Purell, NEW YORKER (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/04/hands-across-america [http://perma.cc/KFS2-JST8].
189
See CONTAGION (Warner Bros. 2011); see also OUTBREAK (Warner Bros. 1995).
190
See PAUL STARR, Book One: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry,
in THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (Basic Books 1982).
191
See Sanchez, supra note 94.
192
Dionne Searcey, The Last Place on Earth With Ebola: Getting Guinea to Zero, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/world/africa/the-last-place-on-earth-with-ebola-guineas-fightto-get-to-zero.html?_r=0.
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hard to end the most recent Ebola epidemic in Guinea has been the low level constant
progress of the disease until its extinguishment, unlike its progression in Liberia and
Sierra Leone.193 Guinea, in short, never had the visible “apocalyptic transmission” of
the Ebola virus found elsewhere.194 The lack of public viewing of the carnage from
healthcare-associated infections in America has some resonance with this struggle.
Americans are oblivious to the fact that acute care hospitals are not the only
healthcare institutions struggling with this epidemic, 195 and that we are not the only
country struggling with bacteria resistant to antibiotics. 196 Nursing homes are also at
the epicenter of our plague of antibiotic-resistant infections,197 but we ignore the sage
wisdom that only those with absolutely no choice should surrender to an in-patient
admission.198
This wisdom is the advice of another era. It was not until well into the twentieth
century that those with financial resources elected to undergo surgical procedures
outside of their homes.199 Now, there is no surgery in the home, but rather out-patient
ambulatory facilities, where exposure to healthcare-associated infections is believed to
be less likely,200 allowing for a hastier retreat to the perceived safety of our homes.
Even this belief has been shaken by the revelation that outpatient clinics do not
systematically record or report surgical site infections. 201 With an increasing
percentage202 of all surgeries now performed at ambulatory surgical centers, it is
apparent that our failure to monitor surgical infections at these centers, as well as other

193

Id.
Id.
195
See, e.g., CDC, Nursing Homes and Assisted Living (Long-Term Care Facilities [LTCFs]),
CDC.GOV (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/longtermcare/index.html [http://perma.cc/8M7J-VGQL]
(describing high rates of infection in long-term care facilities).
196
See Lewis W. Diuguid, Antibiotics Grow Less Effective Against Infections, Creating Global
Concern, KAN. CITY STAR (May 1, 2014, 11:00 AM), http://www.kansascity.com/opinion/opn-columnsblogs/lewis-diuguid/article348046/Antibiotics-grow-less-effective-against-infections-creating-globalconcern.html [http://perma.cc/VT57-4DTM]; see also Antimicrobial Resistance: A Problem Without
Borders, Panel Discussion at the Institute of Medicine 2014: Richard and Hinda Rosenthal Symposium (May
6, 2014).
197
See Aurora Aguilar, CDC Steps Up Battle to Squash Superbugs in Nursing Homes, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Sept. 15, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150915/NEWS/150919916
[http://perma.cc/EG2V-762T].
198
CONSUMERREPORTS,
How
Your
Hospital
Can
Make
You
Sick,
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/health/hospital-acquired-infections/index.htm [http://perma.cc/27G26ZXT] (quoting one doctor cautioning patients to be on “high alert” any time they enter a hospital); see also
Joel Keehn, 12 Hospitals You Might Want to Avoid, CONSUMERREPORTS (Dec. 7, 2015),
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/health/12-hospitals-to-avoid [http://perma.cc/A6TT-7755] (listing
hospitals with allegedly poor infection control mechanisms).
199
STARR, supra note 190, at 157 (“After 1900, as the old prejudice died out, most surgery moved
inside hospitals.”); see also Ann Marie Marciarille, Healing Medicare Hospital Recidivism: Causes and
Cures, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 51 (2011) (“[B]y 1913 an observable decline in home care of the sick had
been noted . . . .”).
200
Dina Fine Maron, Under the Knife: Where Infections Fly Under the Radar, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
(May 19, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/under-the-knife-where-infections-fly-under-theradar/ [http://perma.cc/L2XG-P3RZ] (quoting one doctor saying that “experience suggests the yield [for
infections] will be fairly low for these procedures that would be included” in ambulatory surgery centers).
The discrepancy in infections may be partially attributed to the average patient pool in ambulatory surgery
centers being healthier and lower risk than the average patient pool in hospitals. See MEDPAC, Chapter 5:
Ambulatory Surgical Center Services, in REPORTS TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT AND POLICY
120, 125 (Mar. 2015), http://www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/mar14_ch05.pdf [http://perma.cc/AH5VBUVY].
201
Maron, supra note 200.
202
Id.
194
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outpatient clinics, may have caused us to exclude large numbers of such infections
from the surgical site infections database.203
The irony is that we are the transmission vectors of many healthcare-associated
infections.204 The most threatening bacteria include CRE (popularly known as
“nightmare bacteria”),205 Clostridium difficile (popularly known as “C. diff.”),206 and
Gonorrhea.207
In addition, healthcare facilities represent the perfect storm of immunocompromised individuals, close living and treatment quarters, and twentieth century
hygiene standards.208 Hospitals are institutions in which everyone—patients, staff, and
visitors—leaves a microbial imprint. 209 While we rally enthusiastically around all
possibilities of a cure or of a one shot fix, 210 we barely acknowledge the infectious
disease aspects of transmission of healthcare-associated infections, many of which are
acute bacterial skin infections. Our focus has been on individual solutions for what is
characterized as an individual episode of illness. 211 When the New York Times reports
that celebrity Sandra Lee has been released from the hospital after surgery for a
“lingering infection” following a double mastectomy, the focus was on the cancer,
with no explanation of the “unexpected setback” that was clearly a major surgical site
infection.212 The irony is that even after successful individual decolonization,213 a
small number of MRSA bacteria are thought to be harbored in the host until conditions
become more hospitable to proliferation. 214 In addition, many patients do not finish the

203

Id.
See, e.g., CDC, Healthcare Associated Infections (HAIs): Staphylococcus aureus in Healthcare
Settings, CDC.GOV (Jan. 17, 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/HAI/organisms/staph.html [http://perma.cc/8DJNPGUK] (“Staphylcoccus aureus . . . is a type of bacteria that about 30% of people carry in their noses.”).
205
CDC NEWSROOM, Media Advisory: CDC’s Graphs of the Year: Nightmare Bacteria Spread and
100,000
Smokers
Likely
Quit
with
Tips,
CDC.GOV
(Dec.
31,
2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2013/a1231-graphs-year.html [http://perma.cc/KB44-2HJE].
206
As of March 2012, the CDC Vital Signs publication estimates 94% of c. difficile infections are
healthcare associated, accounting for approximately 14,000 U.S. deaths each year. CDC VITALSIGNS,
Making
Healthcare
Safer:
Stopping
C.
Difficile
Infections
(Mar.
2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/hai/stoppingcdifficile/ [http://perma.cc/2LUX-LR7V].
207
NIH, Gonorrhea, MEDLINEPLUS. http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007267.htm
[http://perma.cc/X2DJ-G6UN] (last updated May 5, 2015) (describing symptoms, causes and treatment and
causes of Gonorrhea).
208
CONSUMERREPORTS, How Your Hospital Can Make You Sick, supra note 198.
209
See Brian Handwerk, You Produce a Microbial Cloud That Can Act Like an Invisible Fingerprint,
SMITHSONIAN.COM (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/you-producemicrobial-cloud-can-act-invisible-fingerprint-180956698/?no-ist [http://perma.cc/447V-YMHN].
210
Roni Caryn Rabin, Single Dose of Antibiotic Found Effective in Quelling MRSA, N.Y. TIMES (June
4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/05/health/single-dose-of-antibiotic-found-effective-in-quellingmrsa.html?_r=0.
211
Kerry O’Connell, Two Arms, Two Choices: If Only I’d Known Then What I Know Now, 31 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 1895, 1899 (2012) (“But we shouldn’t all have to learn everything the painful way, through tragic
individual experiences. Wise systems learn systematically from the collective experience of millions of good
and bad outcomes.”).
212
Jesse McKinley, Sandra Lee Is Released From Hospital After Surgery for Infection, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/nyregion/sandra-lee-to-be-released-from-hospitalafter-surgery-for-infection.html.
213
Decolonization is use of topical and/or systemic agents to suppress or eliminate colonization, and it
may reduce risk of subsequent infections in colonized individuals. John Jernigan & Allex Kallen,
Decolonization Therapy for MRSA Carriers 25, in Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
Infections Presentations (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.cdc.gov/HAI/pdfs/toolkits/MRSA_toolkit_white_
020910_v2.pdf [http://perma.cc/UFV7-NCAW].
214
See Michael Addidle, Woolly Mammoths or Unknown Soldiers?, MICROBIOLOGY MATTERS! (Sept.
28, 2013), http://microbiologymatters.com/?p=1934 [http://perma.cc/AG3U-9LCR].
204
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complicated treatment regimen required for these infections, adding to the risk of
producing even more drug-resistant bacteria.215
We approached Ebola’s arrival at our shores in much the same way. Focused on
the individual,216 and less attuned to the screening prompted by public health concerns,
Texas Presbyterian Hospital in Dallas justified sending Thomas Duncan home from its
emergency department with a fever and abdominal pain after his arrival from
Liberia.217 Whether this was the error of an arguably overwhelmed urban emergency
department, or a manifestation of a larger imperative to provide a minimalist
interpretation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(“EMTALA”), is hard to say. Texas Presbyterian Hospital was slow to concede error
as to the former, and it is well protected by legal precedent interpreting EMTALA only
to require that Thomas Duncan be treated as other similarly situated individuals,
regardless of insurance status.218 Thomas Duncan’s non-treatment only gradually came
to be seen as a societal problem.219
B. RECOGNIZING THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM
Americans are at a moment of transition in our understanding and treatment of
healthcare-associated infections. This transformation has developed with the growing
recognition that an estimated one in twenty-five220 hospitalized individuals will
struggle with a healthcare-associated infection, and an estimated 99,000 deaths a year
result from these infections.221 The CDC estimates that 1.7 million healthcareassociated infections occur each year in the United States. 222 These deaths are also not
evenly distributed throughout the population, as both the young and the old are more
vulnerable to increased mortality from these infections. 223 Even patients at our finest

215

Rabin, supra note 110.
Some have suggested that Thomas Duncan’s race and insurance status—both individual
characteristics—may also have played a role in the decision to send him home. Lauren Gambino & Tom
Dart, Medical Records Reveal Deceased Texas Ebola Patient Sent Home With High Fever, GUARDIAN (Oct.
10, 2014, 4:19 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/10/thomas-duncan-ebola-medical-recordshigh-fever [http://perma.cc/8PQ4-8RW3].
217
Id.
218
Diana E. Schaffner, EMTALA: All Bark and No Bite, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1021, 1031 (2005)
(explaining that EMTALA “only guarantees nondiscriminatory emergency medical treatment” and does not
“guarantee that all patients are properly diagnosed” or “ensure that they receive adequate care”).
219
See Gambino, supra note 216.
220
Magill, supra note 49, at 1198 (“Out of 11,282 patients, 452 had 1 or more healthcare-associated
infections.”).
221
It was not until 2013 that the CDC attempted a first-ever national snapshot of antibiotic-resistant
infections, in general. See Preventing Healthcare-Associated Infections, supra note 78; see also Dina Fine
Maron, Drug-Resistant Superbugs Kill at Least 23,000 People in the U.S. Each Year, SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN: OBSERVATIONS (Sept. 16, 2013), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/drugresistant-superbugs-kill-at-least-23000-people-in-the-us-each-year/ [http://perma.cc/6BQ4-QAM5].
222
See Megan McArdle, How Bad Are Hospital Acquired Infections in America?, ATLANTIC: HEALTH
(Sept.
1,
2011),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/09/how-bad-are-hospital-acquiredinfections-in-america/244458/ [http://perma.cc/TA2E-5CX4].
223
CDC, Diseases and Organisms in Healthcare Settings, CDC.GOV (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://www.cdc.gov/HAI/organisms/organisms.html [http://perma.cc/XGX7-MVTA] (“Young children, the
elderly, and people with other medical illnesses are most at risk for more severe or prolonged [norovirus]
infection.”); see also Mina Pastagia et al., Predicting Risk of Death from MRSA Bacteremia, 18 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1072, 1078 (2012) (explaining that patients most likely to die from MRSA are the
elderly, patients with liver cirrhosis, patients with renal insufficiency, and patients from nursing homes”).
216
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healthcare facilities are not immune. 224 Additionally, the cost is astronomical, with an
estimated price tag of thirty billion dollars a year.225
The Department of Health and Human Services’ Hospital Compare (“Hospital
Compare”) website, tapping into CDC data on infection control at specific hospitals,
has made data available to the general public since 2012 on six categories of
infections: feeding tubes, catheters, C. diff, MRSA, and surgical site infections after
hysterectomies and colon operations.226 The CDC data are based on self-reported data
from hospitals.227 There is some controversy surrounding the Hospital Compare site’s
identification of more than a quarter of participating hospitals as having at least one
high infection rate for the CDC-identified categories, which invokes questions about
the surgical-procedural mix of more or less invasive surgeries and the integrity of
reporting.228 Institutions that provide more complex surgeries, including those
arguably more prone to surgical site infections because of the duration or scope of
surgical procedures involved,229 contend that the CDC reporting procedure model is
insensitive to these factors. 230 It is difficult to account for the wide variation in
infection rates between providers of more complex surgeries or within a particular
facility relying on the claim of incommensurate measures alone. 231
The measure of C. diff infection in a hospital is also particularly difficult because
such data indirectly measure the success of what a facility does not do. For example,
by restraining the use of some antibiotics, a hospital can successfully manage
conditions that support the growth of C. diff. 232
Healthcare-associated infections are as old as healthcare itself and may have even
played a vivid, though now somewhat obfuscated, role in the founding of the
Republic.233 Though our understanding of the epidemiology of healthcare-associated
infections has improved, actual healthcare-associated infection rates have been quite
intractable. Unlike many other healthcare associated problems, increased knowledge
has not brought diminished suffering. Increased medical knowledge has allowed for
better and more accurate diagnosis of existing suffering but, paradoxically, may also

224

See Christopher Weaver & Jonathan D. Rockoff, Killer Bug Is Traced at NIH Hospital, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 23, 2012, at A3 (detailing a “medical mystery that left six patients dead last year at the National
Institutes of Health’s elite research hospital”).
225
Hartocollis, supra note 168.
226
Rau, supra note 160; see also Measures Displayed on Hospital Compare, MEDICARE.GOV:
HOSPITAL
COMPARE,
http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/Data/Measures-Displayed.html
[http://perma.cc/3REX-JC9F].
227
Data Sources, MEDICARE.GOV: HOSPITAL COMPARE, http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/
Data/Data-Sources.html [http://perma.cc/N4UR-BYJA].
228
See Arlene S. Ash et al., Statistical Issues in Assessing Hospital Performance 7-33 (2012),
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstruments/HospitalQualityInits/Downloads/Statistical-Issues-in-Assessing-Hospital-Performance.pdf
[http://perma.cc/AY6P-C993].
229
Rau, supra note 160 (“Because cancer surgeries take longer than regular hysterectomies, often
involving removal of pelvic lymph nodes, the chances of infection are greater.”).
230
Id. (explaining that many hospitals claim the CDC data makes them “look bad because they are
more vigilant in identifying and reporting infections, or because they handle very sick patients who are more
prone to catching a bug”).
231
See id. (“Yale-New Haven Hospital had lower rates of bloodstream infections caused by central
lines, but higher rates of infections from catheters inserted into the bladder to remove urine.”).
232
Id.
233
Vernillia R. Randall, Bioterrorism, Public Health and the Law: Early Biological War on Native
Americans (Nov. 30, 2002), http://academic.udayton.edu/health/syllabi/Bioterrorism/00intro02.htm
[http://perma.cc/8MBE-9TH9] (discussing early biological war on Native Americans during the French &
Indian War in the mid 1700s).
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have created the circumstances for easier transmission of healthcare-associated
infections.
All of this is further complicated by the fact that there are multiple drug-resistant
bacteria and fungi that are of concern. In 2013, the CDC identified three bacteria as
“urgent”—including CRE, C. diff., and Gonorrhea.234
Just as the number of reported healthcare associated MRSA cases has declined
steeply in the past decade,235 there has been only a modest decline in reported
community-acquired MRSA infections.236 This higher rate could be attributed to the
use of antibiotics in the food supply237 or to the growth of the kind of comorbidities in
the general population that make individuals opportunistic targets for such
infections.238
Not all healthcare-associated infections are antibiotic-resistant. However, the
growth of antibiotic-resistant pathogens makes infections difficult or impossible to
control.239 The problem is both one of infection and of infection treatment in what the
World Health Organization (“WHO”) has termed a “post-antibiotic era.”240 An
estimated two million Americans develop antibiotic-resistant infections each year,
with an estimated 23,000 death toll. 241 But the most serious antibiotic resistance
problems are found in hospitals,242 partly because this is where the sickest individuals
are found,243 and partly because this is where those most vulnerable to increased
morbidity and mortality from exposure to antibiotic-resistant infections are found.244
Individuals undergoing invasive procedures who also have underlying co-morbidities
such as diabetes, asthma, and rheumatoid arthritis, have compromised immune systems
that make them antibiotic-resistant infection targets.245
The distinction between hospital and community acquired MRSA may be difficult
to draw in a world of quicker and sicker hospital discharges and common re-

234

See CDC, ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE THREATS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 127, at 7.
See Raymund Dantes et al., National Burden of Invasive Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus
aureus Infections, United States, 2011, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1970, 1970 (2013) (nothing that,
“[s]ince 2005, adjusted national estimated incidence rates decreased among HACO infections by 27.7% and
hospital-onset infections decreased by 54.2%.”).
236
Id. (“[C]ommunity-associated infections decreased by only 5.0%.”).
237
See C. Lee Ventola, The Antibiotic Resistance Crisis: Part 1: Causes and Threats, 40 PHARMACY
AND THERAPEUTICS 277, 279 (2015) (noting that recent “molecular detection methods have demonstrated
that resistant bacteria in farm animals reach consumers through meat products”).
238
See Franklin D. Lowy, Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus: Where Is It Coming From and
Where Is It Going?, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1978 (2013).
239
New York Times Editorial Board, The Rise of Antibiotic Resistance, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/11/opinion/sunday/the-rise-of-antibiotic-resistance.html; see also WORLD
HEALTH ORG., supra note 114, at XIX (noting that “[antimicrobial resistance] results in reduced efficacy of
antibacterial, antiparasitic, antiviral and antifungal drugs, making the treatment of patients difficult, costly,
or even impossible”).
240
Id. at IX (defining a “post-antibiotic era” as one “in which common infections and minor injuries
can kill”).
241
Maron, supra note 221.
242
Id.; see also INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, The Resistance Phenomenon in Microbes
and Infectious Disease Vectors: Implications for Human Health and Strategies for Containment 9 (Stacey L.
Knobler et al. eds., 2003), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK97138/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK97138.pdf
[http://perma.cc/X3RH-LJM2] (“The combination of highly susceptible immunosuppressed patients . . . who
lack the basic immune mechanisms so essential to elimination of pathogens, intensive and prolonged
antimicrobial use, close proximity among patients, and multiple invasive procedures have resulted in
hospital-acquired infections that are highly resistant to available therapeutics.”).
243
INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, supra note 242.
244
Id.
245
Maron, supra note 221.
235
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admissions.246 Hospital patients thus give and receive infections because they shed
pathogens as well as harmless bacteria when they are discharged and re-admitted.
“[P]atients leave a microbial mark on hospitals,” which implies that hospitals are as
much the cause of healthcare-associated infections as they are overtaken by such
infections.247
Americans are outraged by news of healthcare-associated infections.248 And we
seek to attack this problem on all fronts, simultaneously. The problem is that we may
be attacking the problem in counter-productive ways. A vertical prevention strategy,
focused on the individual clinical encounter, promotes screening, testing, and
isolation.249 A horizontal prevention strategy focuses on tracking incidence and
transmittal, and improving reporting.250
It may be that the evolving science of measurement of nosocomial 251 infections
may bring these two approaches to loggerheads sooner than imagined. A vertical
infection-prevention strategy both work to lower individual occurrences of nosocomial
infection while also weakening the horizontal infection-prevention strategy of
elimination.252 Our focus on the clinical encounter here may be in tension with public
health goals, which serves as a metaphor for the same problem that looms throughout
our entire healthcare system. Our goal of better individual clinical outcomes may not
be entirely consistent with better public health. Ebola may be the wake-up call for
infection control that the American healthcare system has so assiduously avoided.
IV. DEALING WITH HACS
The study of healthcare-associated infections is as much art as it is science. The
science involves big data, statistical manipulation, and epidemiology, but the art is in
defining the topic.

246
Xufeng Qian et al., ‘Quicker and Sicker’ Under Medicare’s Prospective Payment System for
Hospitals: New Evidence on an Old Issue From a National Longitudinal Survey, 63 BULLETIN ECON. RES.
1, 1-2 (2011).
247
Beth Mole, Patients Leave a Microbial Mark on Hospitals, NATURE (May 23, 2013),
http://www.nature.com/news/patients-leave-a-microbial-mark-on-hospitals-1.13057 [http://perma.cc/4RFV6HXE].
248
See MRSA Outbreak Affects Babies at Sutter Memorial, CBS SACRAMENTO (Aug. 27, 2012 10:11
PM), http://sacramento.cbslocal.com/2012/08/27/mrsa-outbreak-affects-sutter-memorial-babies/
[http://perma.cc/48WD-XRN4] (quoting the statements of an indignant mother of a newborn diagnosed with
MRSA: “I just think for them not to be able to tell my baby how he got MRSA is not OK . . . [t]hey’re the
hospital, they should have answers.”).
249
Richard P. Wenzel & Michael B. Edmond, Infection Control: the Case for Horizontal Rather than
Vertical Interventional Programs, 14S4 INT’L J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES S3, S3 (2010).
250
Id.
251
See
Nosocomial
definition,
ACADEMIC
DICTIONARIES
AND
ENCYCLOPEDIAS,
http://medicine.academic.ru/5737/Nosocomial [http://perma.cc/M2DS-WAH4] (“Nosocomial: Originating
or taking place in a hospital, acquired in a hospital, especially in reference to an infection. The term
‘nosocomial’ comes from two Greek words: ‘nosus’ meaning ‘disease’ + ‘komeion’ meaning ‘to take care
of.’ Hence, ‘nosocomial’ should apply to any disease contracted by a patient while under medical care.
However, ‘nosocomial’ has been whittled down over the years and now just refers to hospitals — it is now
synonymous with hospital-acquired.”).
252
See Wenzel & Edmond, supra note 249, at S3.
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A. WHAT ARE HACS?
We know, or think we know, what hospital acquired conditions are. They are
conditions that patients acquire while receiving treatment for another condition in an
acute healthcare setting.253
Hospital-acquired infections, as understood in the Medicare program, are included
in this definition.254 For Medicare reimbursement or non-reimbursement purposes, a
HAC requires a qualifying diagnosis code and evidence that this diagnosis was not
present at the time of inpatient admission, or documentation that is insufficient to
determine if the condition was present at the time of inpatient admission. 255 This
definition requires that proof of non-existence of a healthcare-associated infection be
collected at the door of the admitting acute care hospital, for example, by screening for
MRSA colonization at admission or running the risk of being accountable for failing to
do so.
Outside of Medicare, HAC definitions are more diffuse. By one measure of
incidence, most “infections that become clinically evident after 48 hours of
hospitalization are considered hospital-acquired.”256
B. IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Healthcare-associated infections, in the United Kingdom, are defined as
“infections resulting from medical care or treatment in hospital [in or out-patient],
nursing home, or the patient’s own home.” 257 There, the emphasis is not on hospital
acquired infections, but rather on healthcare-associated infections.258 Illustrating the
theory that what you look for may help determine what you find, the infection

253
Amanda Cassidy, Medicare’s Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program, HEALTH AFFAIRS:
HEALTH POLICY BRIEF 1, 1 (Aug. 6, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/
healthpolicybrief_142.pdf [http://perma.cc/6N5X-69XL]; see also CMS, Hospital-Acquired Conditions,
CMS.GOV (Aug. 19, 2015, 8:02 AM), http://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-servicepayment/hospitalacqcond/hospital-acquired_conditions.html [http://perma.cc/MF3E-EFT7] (providing a list
of examples of HACs recognized by CMS).
254
See CMS, Hospital-Acquired Conditions, supra note 253 (listing various Surgical Site Infections,
which fall under the broader “Hospital–Acquired Conditions” category).
255
CMS, Hospital-Acquired Conditions (Present on Admission Indicator), CMS.GOV (Sept. 29, 2014,
3:49 PM), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/HospitalAcqCond/
index.html?redirect=/hospitalacqcond/06_hospital-acquired_conditions.asp [http://perma.cc/5XDL-VJ94];
CMS, Coding, CMS.GOV (Aug. 20, 2015, 8:44 AM), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-forService-Payment/HospitalAcqCond/Coding.html [http://perma.cc/4EKJ-UYPP].
256
Ruth L. Kleinpell et al., PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY: AN EVIDENCE-BASED HANDBOOK FOR
NURSES, CHAPTER 42: TARGETING HEALTHCARE-ASSOCIATED INFECTIONS: EVIDENCE-BASED STRATEGIES
(Ronda G. Hughes ed., 2008), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK2632/ [http://perma.cc/JPA3KZLR].
257
Ruth Kipping et al., North Somerset Council, Health Protection: Infectious Diseases 1, 11 (2014),
http://www.n-somerset.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/health-protection-and-infectious-diseaseschapter.pdf [http://perma.cc/7G3W-AF77].
258
See PUBLIC HEALTH ENG., Healthcare Associated Infections (HCAI): Guidance, Data and Analysis,
GOV.UK (July 31, 2014), http://www.gov.uk/government/collections/healthcare-associated-infections-hcaiguidance-data-and-analysis [http://perma.cc/6KQZ-ZY6A] (using the term “healthcare associated
infections” rather than “hospital acquired infections”); Rob Carr et al., Healthcare Associated Infection
Operational Guidance and Standards for Health Protection Units 1, 4 (2012),
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/332051/HCAI_Operationalgui
dancefinalamended_05July2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/3Y99-CX8Q] (“The term HCAI covers a wide range of
infections . . . [including those contracted] as a direct result of healthcare delivery in the community, [and]
as a result of an infection originally acquired outside a healthcare setting . . . and brought into a healthcare
setting by patients, staff or visitors and transmitted to others within that setting.”)
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preventionists in the United Kingdom have chosen not to target acute healthcare
facilities alone.259
In the U.K. the Public Health England (“PHE”)—an independent organization set
up by the government—mandates that each of the health trusts report all cases of blood
stream infection caused by MRSA, CRE and infections with C. diff. 260 Additionally,
PHE makes its surveillance data available on a proprietary website. 261 PHE also
operates the Surgical Site Infection Surveillance Scheme by which it helps hospitals
self-monitor their own rates of post-surgical infection and compare that data with that
of their competitions.262
C. PAY FOR PERFORMANCE?
In the United States, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”)
attempts to wield the power of the purse by making six conditions related to infections
non-reimbursable.263 The Joint Commission now lists Catheter-Associated Urinary
Tract Infections as the most common hospital-acquired infection.264 But, “the problem
of rising antimicrobial resistance is as much about economics as it is about science or
medicine,”265 and so all three must be analyzed.
D. DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL: A CODE OF SILENCE
MRSA has been reported to be able to live on the surface of hospital equipment
for as long as nine months.266 This means that infection preventionists ought to be just
as interested in how MRSA lives inside of a hospital as they are in how it enters the
hospital. It also means that America’s healthcare facilities may have an incomplete
disinfection problem. Experiments with the use of ultra violet light and the use of
hydrogen peroxide fogging agents have been able to reduce the MRSA rates by
considerable amounts267 but both approaches take considerable careful effort and, most
importantly, time.
America’s acute care hospitals live and die by their occupancy rates. And
occupancy is most productive when it is either continuous or contains the least amount
of unoccupied intervals as possible. Fogging a patient room between patients with
259
See PUB. HEALTH ENG., supra note 258 (including an instructional section on infection prevention
and control in “care homes”).
260
See Carr, supra note 258, at 14 (noting that “[t]he effectiveness of HPA surveillance systems . . .
depends entirely on the ability of providers to . . . routinely report [cases of infection] to the HPA”).
261
See PUB. HEALTH ENG., MRSA, MSSA and E. Coli Bacteraemia and Clostridium Difficile Infection:
Annual Data for Independent Sector Healthcare Organisations, GOV.UK (Oct. 6, 2015),
http://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/mrsa-mssa-and-e-coli-bacteraemia-and-clostridium-difficileinfection-annual-data-for-independent-sector-healthcare-organisations [http://perma.cc/Q9GD-MU5K].
262
See Carr, supra note 258, at 16-17.
263
See CMS, Hospital-Acquired Conditions, supra note 253.
264
Standards FAQ Details: Surveillance Requirements for CAUTI, JOINT COMM’N (July 18, 2011),
http://www.jointcommission.org/standards_information/jcfaqdetails.aspx?StandardsFAQId=442 (noting that
“[u]rinary tract infections are the most common type of healthcare-associated infection, accounting for more
than 30% of infections reported by acute care hospitals”).
265
See Jim O’Neill, The Economic Consequences of Drug Resistance, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Dec. 12,
2014),
http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2014/12/the-economic-consequences-of-drug-resistance
[http://perma.cc/W2ZD-PYMV].
266
How a Robot is Helping Reduce Hospital-Borne Infections, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Feb.
20, 2014, 4:15 PM), http://www.rwjf.org/en/blogs/new-public-health/2014/02/how_r2d2_is_helping.html
[http://perma.cc/DZ64-WNW3].
267
See Narrow-Spectrum UV Light May Reduce Surgical Infections & Hydrogen Peroxide Vapor
Enhances Hospital Disinfection, supra note 70.
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hydrogen peroxide lengthens the turnaround time for a hospital bed because it involves
opening and closing air ducts.268
Those with compromised immune systems are far more likely to have staph
present on their skin turn into one of these diseases.269 This means that serious staph
infections are more likely found in those hospitalized for relatively lengthy periods, 270
including dialysis patients, cancer patients, users of illegal injectable drugs, and
surgical patients.271 It is a strength of our healthcare system that we are able to prolong
the lives of those with compromised immune systems,272 whether they are chronically
or temporarily compromised. It is a weakness in any plan for healthcare-associated
infection control to have so many immuno-compromised people passing through our
healthcare facilities.273 Similarly, it is a strength that so many individuals now receive
care that was formally delivered only in acute care settings 274 in out-patient settings
while it is also a weakness in any plan for healthcare-associated infection control to
have the sickest of the sick and the most immuno-compromised concentrated in our
acute healthcare facilities.275
Community-acquired MRSA targets congregate living and care, including those
who are tattooed and who share athletic locker rooms, children in day-care settings,
and members of the military.276 It is in the acute care hospital setting where these two
worlds collide. A hospital is, at least in its most common modern configuration of
sometimes shared and sometimes single rooms,277 a congregate living arrangement,
268

See Hydrogen Peroxide Vapor Enhances Hospital Disinfection, supra note 70.
See U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED., MRSA, supra note 71 (“Serious staph infections are more common
in people with chronic (long-term) medical problems.”).
270
See Minnesota Department of Health, Causes and Symptoms of HA-MRSA, MINNESOTA.GOV,
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/idepc/diseases/mrsa/hamrsa/basics.html
[http://perma.cc/SJ9L-F3TY]
(noting that “[h]ospitalized patients are at increased risk for MRSA infection” because “[m]any hospitalized
patients are taking antibiotics that can decrease the normal flora found on the body, giving MRSA strains an
advantage,” and “[m]any patients in hospitals have breaks in their skin . . . that can allow bacteria to enter
underlying tissues or the bloodstream”).
271
See Joel W. Beam & Bernadette Buckley, Community-Acquired Methicillin-Resistant
Staphylococcus aureus: Prevalence and Risk Factors, 41 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 337, 337 (2006) (“The risk
factors identified were recent hospitalization. . . . chronic illness, injection drug use.”); Navy Envtl. Health
Ctr., Guidelines for the Management of Community-Acquired Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus
(CA-MRSA) Infections in the US Navy and Marine Corps, 1, 5 (2005), http://fhp.osd.mil/pdfs/CAMRSAguidelines.pdf [http://perma.cc/4CNR-GZ7M] (“Staphylococcal colonization occurs more commonly
in injection drug users, individuals with type 1 diabetes, hemodialysis patients, persons with acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), surgical patients, and previously hospitalized patients.”).
272
U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Preserving Health and Prolonging Life for People with
HIV (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.nih.gov/research-training/preserving-health-prolonging-life-people-hiv
[http://perma.cc/8Q2E-F6WA].
273
See generally Marciarille, supra note 199, at 62 (arguing that Medicare hospital discharge “is not
designed to promote successful community re-entry or reduce hospital recidivism”).
274
Id. at 43 (noting that “[w]ell into the twentieth century, the dominant model was for patients to
experience their general acute care illnesses at their homes,” but that “a different hospitalization and posthospitalization model ha[s] grown up in an attempt to mediate the relationships between the hospital, the
family, and other social service institutions outside the hospital”).
275
See generally Emily R. M. Sydnor & Trish M. Perl, Hospital Epidemiology and Infection Control in
Acute-Care Settings, 24 CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY REV. 142, 144 (2011) (reporting that “[r]oughly 25% of
nosocomial infections occur in intensive care units (ICUs)”).
276
Beam & Buckley, supra note 271, at 338 (“recent outbreaks of CA-MRSA have been reported . . .
among athletic teams”); Navy Envtl. Health Ctr., supra note 271, at 5 (“Military conditions often involve
prolonged close contact between individuals. These close contact situations, combined with lapses in
personal hygiene (particularly in the recruit and deployed settings) are an ideal environment for CA-MRSA
transmission.”).
277
See generally Kevin Cullinan & Martha Wolf, The Patient Room: What is the Ideal Solution?,
Planning and Managing the Workplace: Evidence-Based Design and the Organizational Ecology of
269
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replete with residents with the most compromised immune systems and staffed by
many younger and healthier individuals who are likely athletes, parents of children in
day-care, and perhaps tattooed.278
The war against drug-resistant bacteria will, in no small measure, have to fathom
how to measure MRSA incidence and prevention in people who have never been
hospitalized.279
E. WE COULD KNOW SO MUCH MORE
As The Economist has observed, “[t]o improve healthcare, governments need to
use the right data.”280 We are less than certain what the right data is that should be used
to target healthcare-associated infections. This uncertainty is an inhibitor on accurate
commensurable data collection involving healthcare-associated infections and is an
inhibitor to the comparative study of infection transmission and infection in the wider
community.
The most vulnerable patients in an acute care facility are typically found in the
facility’s intensive care unit (“ICU”).281 There, MRSA’s persistence and transmission
could be the most apparent. It was in the ICU that the battle of targeted versus
universal testing and decolonization for MRSA was played out.282 Both targeted
decolonization and universal decolonization of patients in the ICU were viable
candidate strategies to prevent healthcare-associated infection transmission in the ICU
and universal MRSA screening and targeted isolation added a third possible
approach.283
The development of ultrafast gene sequencing has changed the nature of viral
infection identification.284 Ironically, our love of gene sequencing extends to the
highest levels of government,285 but not to the lowest levels of MRSA.

Healthcare
Environments,
Cornell
University,
1,
23-29
(2010),
http://iwsp.human.cornell.edu/files/2013/09/The-patient-room-what-is-the-ideal-solution-26h3eox.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8GRX-M98H] (discussing single versus multi-patient rooms).
278
See Martin E. Stryjewski & Henry F. Chambers, Skin and Soft-Tissue Infections Caused by
Community-Acquired Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, 46 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES
S368, S369 (2008) (noting that “CA-MRSA infections have been reported in . . . tattoo recipients” and that
“[t]ransmission has occurred through activities in which direct contact and turf abrasions are common—for
example, among football players, [and] wrestlers”).
279
See generally, Waging War Against Drug Resistant Bacteria, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND.
(Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.rwjf.org/en/about-rwjf/newsroom/newsroom-content/2013/10/waging-waragainst-drug-resistant-bacteria.html [http://perma.cc/XV6V-ABSJ] (“We were seeing MRSA in subjects
who had never been hospitalized.”).
280
Measuring
Healthcare:
Need
to
Know,
ECONOMIST
(Feb.
1,
2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21595474-improve-health-care-governments-need-use-rightdata-need-know.
281
See Jane D. Siegel et al., CDC, Management of Multi-Drug Resistant Organisms In Healthcare
Settings
1,
7
(2006),
http://www.cdc.gov/hicpac/pdf/guidelines/MDROGuideline2006.pdf
[http://perma.cc/56W8-CUNB] (“Hospitalized patients, especially ICU patients, tend to have more risk
factors than non-hospitalized patients do, and have the highest infection rates.”).
282
Susan S. Huang et al., Targeted Versus Universal Decolonization to Prevent ICU Infection, 368
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2255 (2013).
283
Id. at 2255.
284
Angier, supra note 27 (“Through ultrafast gene sequencing and targeted gene silencing techniques,
researchers have identified genes critical to viral infection and drug resistance. ‘We’ve discovered viruses
we didn’t even know existed,’ Dr. Freed said.”).
285
Austin Frakt & Aaron E. Carroll, Can This Treatment Help Me? There’s a Statistic for That, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/upshot/can-this-treatment-help-me-theres-astatistic-for-that.html (noting that in his 2015 State of the Union address, “President Obama encouraged the
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IF IGNORANCE IS BLISS, ‘TIS FOLLY TO BE WISE

The incentive to remain ignorant of healthcare-associated infection prevalence in
acute care facilities is strong. Even if acknowledged, the incentives to change reporting
are stronger than those to change behavior.286 Inevitably, this leads to the question of
whether an outcome-oriented regulation is the answer.
Healthcare-associated infections are not the only pay for performance measure
founded and foundering on a self-reported compliance measure. CMS’s Nursing Home
Compare website has recently revamped its star ratings systems in light of apparent
rampant gaming of self-reported data.287 Seen from this perspective, we want to pay
for quality, but only if quality goals are easily achieved. 288
V. MOVING AWAY FROM DON’T ASK DON’T TELL
The Affordable Care Act has three quality-based penalty programs, each of which
is based on one or more quality-of-care metrics.289
A. HIGH-TECH MOLECULAR DETECTION
The CDC has targeted antibiotic-resistance in general through the proposal of an
Advanced Molecular Detection initiative, using technologies like genome sequencing
to improve detection and epidemiology,290 as well as through improvements to the
National Healthcare Safety Network, to provide an integrated reporting system for
healthcare-associated infections.291 Communities, health providers, and healthcare

development of ‘precision medicine,’ which would tailor treatments based on individuals’ genetics or
physiology”).
286
See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, Medical Malpractice Litigation and Tort Reform: It’s the
Incentives, Stupid, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1085, 1086 (2006) (noting that the tort system “rather than motivating
providers to do better . . . paralyzes them with fear and causes them to hide their mistakes”); David A.
Hyman, Healthcare Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the
Workmen", 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531, 533 (2001) (arguing that “addressing the problem of healthcare fraud
and abuse” is “considerably more difficult than condemning it”).
287
See Julie Appleby, Government to Grade Nursing Homes on Tougher Scale, KAISER HEALTH NEWS
(Feb.
12,
2015),
http://khn.org/news/government-to-grade-nursing-homes-on-tougher-scale/
[http://perma.cc/9SQM-ZLQ8].
288
See Aaron Carroll, We Really Want to Pay for Quality, But It’s So Darn Hard, INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/academyhealth-we-really-want-topay-for-quality-but-its-so-darn-hard/ [http://perma.cc/62JF-S9M3]; Andrew Tobel, Admitting the Problem
With the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, 8 AHLA J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 45, 68-73 (2015)
(providing an assessment of just how difficult it can be to lower some pay for performance measures, like readmissions rates).
289
The Affordable Care Act has created a “Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program” to reduce
payments to hospitals based on patient readmission rates. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(p) (2012). The Act also has a “Payment Adjustment for Hospital Acquired Conditions”
section, which imposes penalties on the twenty-five percent of hospitals whose rates of hospital-acquired
conditions are the highest. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(p). In addition, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
is required to establish a “Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program” (“VBP Program”) that links physician
reimbursements to value in care. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o).
290
See CDC, Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, CDC.GOV (2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/budget/documents/fy2017/ezid-factsheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/7FK9-X6X4].
291
See CDC, What is NHSN?, CDC.GOV (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/aboutnhsn/index.html [http://perma.cc/35DL-7K6V]; see also Maron, supra note 221 (“The [CDC] also requested
an increase of about $12.5 million for improvements to the National Healthcare Safety Network, which
provides an integrated reporting system for healthcare-associated infections.”).
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officials have all offered proposals to prevent both the original incidence and the
spread of healthcare-acquired infections.292
B. CLINICAL HYGIENE
Prevention plans almost always focus on hand washing or hand hygiene, 293 but are
overwhelmingly developed from a consumer-driven perspective.294 Patients, as
healthcare consumers, are urged to insist that all healthcare providers wash their hands
before touching them.295
Engaging patients in the prevention of healthcare-associated infections has great
appeal. Patients should be the most interested in their own health and safety and the
patient is arguably best situated to monitor the hand hygiene practices of providers. 296
But those with compromised immune systems—the aged, the very young, the very
ill—are often the worst equipped to strictly monitor their care for quality. 297 Even the
most robust among us, despite the encouragement to do so, are unlikely to correct a
healthcare provider.298 There also appears to be some relationship between nurses and
better hand hygiene for all hospital based healthcare providers, implying that an active
and energetic hand-hygiene-oriented nursing staff may actually be more successful at
reducing MRSA incidence and transmission rates.299 Nurse staffing patterns may
matter and, if they do, they implicate another costly input for reducing MRSA
transmission in the hospital setting.300

292

See infra Part V.B.
See, e.g., Comprehensive Infection Prevention Strategies, INFECTION CONTROL TODAY,
http://sd.infectioncontroltoday.com/galleries/2015/03/comprehensive-infection-preventionstrategies.aspx?pg=5#gallery [http://perma.cc/9L2A-42T7].
294
See Maron, supra note 200 (“At the Massachusetts Avenue Surgery Center [in Bethesda, Maryland]
. . . , a registered nurse is charged with splitting her time between acting as a postanesthesia care unit nurse
and acting as the facility’s infection control manager.”).
295
Maron, supra note 221 (“Hospital patients . . . should insist everyone wash their hands before
touching them.”).
296
Andrew Ottum et al., Engaging Patients in the Prevention of Health-Care Associated Infections: A
Survey of Patients’ Awareness, Knowledge, and Perceptions Regarding the Risks and Consequences of
Infection with Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus and Clostridium Difficile, 41 AM. J. INFECTION
CONTROL 322, 323 (2013) (finding that “hand hygiene programs that emphasize patient empowerment and
encourage patients to participate in their care have effectively improved compliance with hand hygiene
among healthcare workers”); see also Benedetta Allegranzi et al., Status of the Implementation of the World
Health Organization Multimodal Hand Hygiene Strategy in United States of America Healthcare Facilities,
42 AM. J. INFECTION CONTROL 224, 227 (2014) (noting that “[a]nother element with the potential to make a
significant contribution to the creation of a safety climate is patient involvement”).
297
See Protect Yourself Against Healthcare-Associated Infections (HAIs), PATIENT CARE LINK,
http://www.patientcarelink.org/uploadDocs/1/Massachusetts-Consumer-HAI-Basics.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3KM2-78MT] (providing questions for patients to ask healthcare providers to help protect
themselves against HAIs). Note that the suggested questions require patients to have a degree of strength,
alertness, and awareness that very sick patients may not have. Id.
298
See Pauline W. Chen, Afraid to Speak Up at the Doctor’s Office, N.Y. TIMES: WELL (May 31, 2012,
12:01 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/afraid-to-speak-up-at-the-doctors-office/.
299
Jeannie P. Cimiotti et al., Nurse Staffing, Burnout, and Healthcare–Associated Infection, 40 AM. J.
INFECTION CONTROL 486, 488 (2012) (noting the relationship between nursing burnout and staffing patterns
to the incidence of certain infections).
300
Dep’t for Professional Emps., AFL-CIO, Safe-Staffing Ratios: Benefiting Nurses and Patients, Fact
Sheet 2014 1, 2 (2014), http://dpeaflcio.org/programs-publications/issue-fact-sheets/safe-staffing-ratiosbenefiting-nurses-and-patients/ [http://perma.cc/2NY8-ECPR] (noting that “[h]igh nurse-to-patient ratios are
associated with an increase in medical errors, as well as patient infections, bedsores, pneumonia, MRSA,
cardiac arrest, and accidental death”).
293
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Americans, however, are astonishingly passive in the clinical encounter. 301 There
is considerable debate about the best way to activate healthcare patients as
consumers.302 Thus, this leaves self-policing of hand hygiene to healthcare providers.
The WHO has developed hand hygiene guidelines 303 in stark contrast to the
American “do your own thing” approach to healthcare facility hand hygiene. Even
where expectations are clear, however, the standards are not always met. 304 One study
of 168 United States healthcare facilities participating in the 2009 WHO global
campaign to improve hand hygiene concluded that one in five facilities sampled fails
to place alcohol-based hand sanitizer at every point of care.305 Because they do not
follow conventional rules, American hospitals are known as independent thinkers on
infection prevention, giving rise to a whole industry of professional infection
preventionists who help American hospitals operate unconventionally.
C. WHO MEASURES PERFORMANCE? WHO DECIDES TO PAY?
Beginning in 2008, CMS has refused payment for the correction of certain
hospital-acquired conditions.306 Targeting multiple HACs, the program only partially
targets healthcare-associated infections.307 CMS targeted two kinds of HACs in
particular, central catheter-associated bloodstream infections and catheter-associated
urinary tract infections, in the limited universe of hospitals already participating in the
National Healthcare Safety Network’s data reporting system.308
Interestingly, the pilot program did not, perhaps because it could not, track the
effect of the reimbursement change on infection rates as compared with baseline
trends.309 One study attempting to extract information from the limited data set found
no evidence that the 2008 CMS payment policy reduced infection rates. 310
301
Kaarin Michaelsen et al., Overcoming Patient Barriers to Discussing Physician Hand Hygiene: Do
Patients Prefer Electronic Reminders to Other Methods?, 34 INFECTION CONTROL & HOSP. EPIDEMIOLOGY
929 (2013) (noting little likelihood of patients chastising healthcare personnel for not washing their hands).
302
See generally Jennifer Lenz, Alana Burke & Karen Onstad, National Committee for Quality
Assurance, Value Judgment: Helping Healthcare Consumers Use Quality and Cost Information, CAL.
HEALTHCARE FOUND.: ISSUE BRIEF 1 (Dec. 2012) (proposing that “[i]nformed consumers, armed with
information on value, may help elevate the importance of value in healthcare by shopping for and choosing
providers and health plans that provide high-quality, low-cost care”); Sharon B. Arnold, Improving Quality
Healthcare: the Role of Consumer Engagement, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., ACADEMY HEALTH:
ISSUE BRIEF 1 (Oct. 2007), http://www.academyhealth.org/files/issues/ConsumerEngagement.pdf
[http://perma.cc/XF9F-2PKH] (discussing “Hibbard’s Patient Activation Measure (PAM) that assesses
patients’ knowledge skill and confidence in managing their health and healthcare” as they become “fully
competent managers of their own health and healthcare”).
303
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO Guidelines on Hand Hygiene in Healthcare (2009),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44102/1/9789241597906_eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/UZ36-H3VU].
304
See Allegranzi, supra note 296, at 224 (noting that “compliance with recommended hand hygiene
practices by healthcare workers (HCW) is unacceptably low”).
305
See id. at 225 (noting that “[o]verall, 77.5% of facilities reported that alcohol-based handrub is
continuously available facility wide at each point of care”).
306
See CMS, Hospital-Acquired Conditions (Present on Admission Indicator), supra note 255 (stating
that “[f]or discharges occurring on or after October 1, 2008, hospitals will not receive additional payment for
cases in which one of the selected conditions was not present on admission”).
307
Id.
308
See CDC, Healthcare-Associated Infections, supra note 12 (noting a “50 percent decrease in central
line-associated
bloodstream
infections
(CLABSI)
between
2008-2014,”
and “no change in overall catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTIs) between 2009 and 2014”).
309
See CMS, Hospital-Acquired Conditions (Present on Admission Indicator), supra note 255 (noting
that CMS only required hospitals to “report present on admission information” starting in October of 2007).
310
Grace M. Lee, Effect of Nonpayment for Preventable Infections in U.S. Hospitals, 367 NEW ENG. J.
OF MED. 1428, 1428 (2012) (finding “no evidence that the 2008 CMS policy to reduce payments for central
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Although this study did not discuss payment penalties as much as payment
refusals for corrective measures needed to treat the targeted HACs, 311 the change in
reimbursement from the status quo for the participating entities must surely have been
interpreted as punitive. It is significant, however, that the refusal of reimbursement
extended only to the HAC corrective expenses and not to any of the other costs
associated with the patient treated.312 Although described as “non-payment for
preventable complications,”313 it is clear that the bite of the non-payment could have
been far deeper. Testing whether “avoidance of losses” is really preferable to
“achievement of gains”314 might require a more substantial loss. The corrective
expenses tracked, after all, represented a relatively modest percentage of the total
reimbursement.315
CMS’s Hospital-Acquired Condition Program for 2015316 has been modified. A
HAC is defined as a qualifying diagnosis317 that was either not present on inpatient
admission or when documentation is insufficient to determine if the condition was
present at the time of inpatient admission. 318 Hospitals have been required to submit
Medicare claims specifying whether claims were present on admission since October
of 2007, but it was only as of October 2008 that discharges from hospitals no longer
received additional payment for cases in which one of the selected conditions was not
present at admission.319 Payment is made, in short, as if the secondary diagnosis of
complications from the HAC were not presented for payment. 320 But something else
has been lost as well. HACs continue to be reported as part of the Inpatient Prospective
Payment System (“IPPS”) and subject to payment adjustment,321 but have been
removed from the Inpatient Quality Reporting Program and are no longer reported on
the Hospital Compare website.322 In addition, a new Hospital-Acquired Condition
Reduction Program, associated with discharges beginning on October 1, 2012, has
been added to the current Hospital-Acquired Conditions Program.323 The Fiscal Year
2015 payment adjustment will be reduced by one percent for hospitals that rank among

catheter-associated bloodstream infections and catheter-associated urinary tract infections had any
measurable effect on infection rates in U.S. hospitals”).
311
Id. at 1435 (noting that, although the study focuses on nonpayment for HACs, “[g]reater financial
penalties might induce a greater change in hospital responsiveness to the CMS policy”).
312
Id. at 1428.
313
Id. at 1429.
314
Id.
315
See generally Richard D. Miller, Jr. et al., Readmissions Due to Hospital-Acquired Conditions
(HACs): Multivariate Modeling and Under-Coding Analyses, RTI INT’L (Sept. 2012),
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/HospitalAcqCond/Downloads/FinalReport-Readmissions.pdf [http://perma.cc/7JMX-RAZ3 http://perma.cc/7JMX-RAZ3] (project funded by
CMS) (“Between FY 2009 and FY 2010, we did not discover any large changes in the readmission rates for
any of the HACs.”).
316
See CMS Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program (HACRP), CMS.GOV (Feb. 4, 2016,
1:52 PM), http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/HACReduction-Program.html [http://perma.cc/WA7P-VJSF].
317
See CMS, Hospital-Acquired Conditions, supra note 253 (listing the HAC qualifying diagnoses).
318
See CMS, Hospital-Acquired Conditions (Present on Admission Indicator), supra note 255.
319
Id.
320
See Prospective Payment Systems for Inpatient Hospital Services, 42 C.F.R. § 412.48 (2009).
321
See CMS, Hospital-Acquired Conditions, supra note 253.
322
See
Data
Sources,
MEDICARE.GOV
HOSPITAL
COMPARE,
http://www.medicare.gov/hospitalcompare/Data/Data-Sources.html [http://perma.cc/CC5U-495W].
323
See 42 U.S.C. 1395ww(p); see also Prospective Payment Systems for Inpatient Hospital Services,
42 C.F.R. § 412.172 (2015); CMS Hospital-Acquired Condition Reduction Program (HACRP), supra note
316.
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the lowest-performing twenty five percent with regard to certain enumerated hospitalacquired conditions.324
In sum, the HAC Program for 2015 will have three measures across two Domains,
and Domain 2 will consist of two healthcare-associated infection measures, targeting
central line-associated blood stream infections and catheter-associated urinary tract
infections.325 The focus on healthcare-associated infections is admirable. The target of
only the lowest quartile of performers326 is less so. Penalized institutions will see their
total payments reduced across the board, including indirect medical education
payments to teaching hospitals and disproportionate share payments to DSH
hospitals.327 Seen from one perspective, the HAC Reduction Program is a penalty
program focused on reducing hospital payments for excess HACs in contrast with
other Value-Based Purchasing (“VBP”) and Incentive Programs which reward certain
behaviors.328 Seen from a different perspective, the HAC Program is a percentage
reduction to the amount otherwise payable under the Inpatient Prospective Payment
Systems (“IPPS”), while the other VBP and Readmissions Reduction Programs
represent adjustments to the base Diagnosis-Related Group payments.329 So much
more is at stake with the HAC Reduction Program scoring methodology because the
bite is felt in the hospital’s overall budget.
Similarly, Congress has used no less than the Affordable Care Act to target central
line-associated bloodstream infections (“CLABsis”) acquired in hospitals. 330 CLABsis
identification complexity, however, can teach us some things about the similar
problems in MRSA prevalence data collection. First, there are different methods in use
to identify CLABsis.331 Second, there are different methods of data reporting of an
identified infection.332 CLABsis, like MRSA, is not standardized in method of
identification, method of reporting, or mandated reporting.333
D. THE PROBLEM OF METRICS
The clearest illustration of the inadequacy of performance metrics designed to
monitor and reduce healthcare-associated infections may be best illustrated by the
Partnership for Patients initiative (the “Partnership”). Using baselines set in 2010, the
Partnership has been able to conclude that, there has been a forty-nine percent

324

See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(p)(1).
CDC, Healthcare-Associated Infections, supra note 12.
42 C.F.R. § 412.172 (2015).
327
As compared to Readmissions and VBP Programs, where the payments are based upon Diagnosis
Related Groups (DRGs). See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o).
328
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(p) (penalizing hospitals for excess HACS) with § 1395ww(o)
(establishing value-based incentives for hospital payments).
329
See CMS, Hospital Value-Based Purchasing, CMS.GOV (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/hospital-value-basedpurchasing/index.html?redirect=/Hospital-Value-Based-Purchasing/ [http://perma.cc/N4JT-T6PW].
330
See Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for Acute Care Hospitals and the Long Term
Care Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 2015 Rates, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,853, 50,090 (Aug.
22, 2014) (“For FY 2015, we will keep CDC’s NHSN CAUTI and CLABSI measures in Domain 2 as they
are currently endorsed.”); see also Hospital-Acquired Condition (HAC) Reduction Program, QUALITYNET
http://www.qualitynet.org/dcs/ContentServer?c=Page&pagename=QnetPublic%2FPage%2FQnetTier3&cid
=1228774294977 [http://perma.cc/TKA3-LCQN].
331
See Susan Morabit, NHSN Bloodstream Infection Surveillance in 2015, CDC, 6-34 (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/nhsn/pdfs/training/2015/clabsi-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/VP4P-2JUB].
332
See id. at 64-77.
333
See generally id.
325
326
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reduction in CLABsis as of 2013.334 How does the Partnership know this? Because
hospital-reported data tells them so, though even professional analysts of the numbers
conceded that these successes are evaluated on ever-evolving measures.335 Dr. Peter
Provonost ventures that the improvements in HAC rates at Johns Hopkins, an
estimated thirty-seven percent improvement by 2013, may be attributable more to
documentation and coding in response to penalties than to actual improvements in
quality and safety.336
VI. CONCLUSION
The journey from highly stylized healthcare-associated infection reporting metrics
to the actual experience of Ebola’s arrival in the United States is a convoluted one.
“These Ebola cases should be regarded as a teaching moment and a time to call for
necessary changes and a reinvigoration of infection control and epidemiology
practices. If the CDC and hospital administrators fail to capitalize upon the impetus for
better infection control that we are now seeing with Ebola, that will be a far greater
tragedy.”337 Reinvigoration of infection control in the acute care hospital setting may
have to begin in the Emergency Department in a time of pandemic, a venue that is
often not finely attuned to the dangers of cross infection.
Moreover, it would be a larger failure to ignore what our brush with Ebola could
teach us about the limits of self-reported pay for performance measures in providing
incentives reinvigorate infection control at all points of entry into acute care.
On an international level, targeting antimicrobial resistance itself will require a
globally collaborative effort. Initiatives such as the Wellcome Trusts’ project,
examining the economic issues surrounding antimicrobial resistance, 338 and the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation Grand Challenge to develop Novel Approaches to
Characterizing and Tracking the Global Burden of Antimicrobial Resistance, 339 are a
welcome start. From this perspective, drug resistance is a problem of managing a
shared global resource.340 If we are indeed, as Dr. Lance Price maintains, running

334
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whether interventions to reduce other infections produce the intended impact.”).
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toward the edge of a cliff,341 then our collective situation is very grim indeed. A
developing sense that our national health security is intertwined with global health
security is necessary and appears to be developing, albeit slowly. 342
The term “pay for performance” is now at least a decade old in its application to
healthcare.343 Despite the passage of time we are no closer to uniformity of definition
on what performance we would like to reward. It has been observed that the problem
with our quality metrics is that we use ones that are easy to measure, not ones that
matter.344 This Article has attempted to discern how we reached the position we
currently inhabit with regard to healthcare-associated infections: loving quantity but
despising quality measures.
Our nation’s brush with Ebola reveals that we, like the acute care facility and
public health authorities in West Africa, have incentives to be less than forthcoming
about the incidence and transmission of healthcare-associated infections. Our nation’s
brush with Ebola reveals that our response, like those struggling with Ebola in West
Africa, are constrained and shaped by cultural norms, whether they be burial customs
involving close contact with human bodies in West Africa, 345 or a determination to
implement EMTALA in a way that minimizes acute care hospital exposure to
expensive in-patient stays by the uninsured.346 We, too, are creatures of culture and
may be called upon to re-examine our own culture of care in the context of infectious
disease control inside and outside of acute care facilities.
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